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INTRODUCTION 
"T}xpCRjerty(f our century is unlike that of eoTy other. Itisnot,aspav&ty'wasb j^re,theresukof 
riatimdscardty,butofasetofprioritiesi7q)osedupcintherestofthewofridbytheri£h. Ccinsee^ 4entfy,the 
rrxxkrn poor are rm pitied.. .but written cffastral. ThevwaTtiedo<eTtJiryajnsuniereoana7^hasproduoBd 
thefirstcuburefijruhidoabe^ zrisarardnderofriahiiig." 
- John Berger 
State of the World 
There are more poor in the world today than 50 years ago. Poverty is proportionately 
increasing around the world and even in Industrialized countries. The United Nations declared 
1996 the "International Year for the Eradication of Poverty." In a report "Poverty and 
development: an ^)balance sheet" (United Nations, 1996), issued on the occasion, the world 
boc^ admitted: "Poverty remains, endangering both the people and the planet...." The report 
avows that income disparities between the richest 20 percent and the poorest 20 percent of 
world's population have doubled from 1960 to 1991. Eight hundred million people, including 
children, are chronically undernourished. The world's poorest 50 countries account for less 
than 2 percent of the world's income. More than a billion people in developing coimtries live 
in absolute poverty, making less than $1 a day eacL In South Asia, home to nearfy- half of 
worlds poor, the situation is even worse, ^khbub ul Haq (1995), former direaor of the 
Human Development Report at the UN, observes, "South Asia is fast emei^g as the poorest, 
the most illiterate, the most malnourished, the least gender sensitive —indeed the most 
deprived region in the worid" (1993, p. 5). In South Asia 800 million do without elementary 
sanitation, 380 million are illiterate, and 300 million drink from ponds rather than taps. Haq 
concludes that the scale of social deprivation and human despair is tremendous. 
Behind these statistics and estimates are real human beings, individuals whose 
ambitions are more mundane than what many in the developed world can imagine. For the 
poor of this planet their standard of living is not represented by the number of color TVs they 
possess or whether they shop at ^ ^cy's or at Wal-Mart; for them it's a question of two square 
meals at the end of a grueling workday. Beyond income, poverty deprives individuals of basic 
human rights, including good health, adequate nutrition, literacy, and employment. It deprives 
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the poor of a long, creative, and healthy life. It denies them the right to freedom, dignity, self-
respect and respea for others. As a single mother from Guyana puts it: "Poverty is hunger, 
loneliness, nowhere to go when the day is over, deprivation, discrimination, abuse and 
illiteracy^ (United Nations, 1996, p. 10). The Brand Conunission, an independent commission 
on international development issues states in its report; 
Few People in the North have any detailed conception of poverty in the Third World. 
Many hundreds of millions of people in the poorer countries are preoccupied solefy-
with survival and elementary needs. Permanent insecurity is the condition of the poor. 
Flood, draught or disease affecting people or livestock can destroy livelihoods. The 
combination of malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, high birth rate, under employment and 
low income closes off the avenues of escape; and while other groups are increasingly 
vocal, the poor and illiterate are usually and conveniently silent (Brandt Commission, 
1980, p. 20) 
Ironicalfy^, the majority of the world's popxilation today lives in more and more suffering 
amidst more and more wealth. Unfortunately, as Burger sums it up in the beginning quote, the 
human suffering this world is experiencing today is depressingly unique because recent 
technological breakthroughs and the labor of billions of individuals gradually have contributed in 
providing the basis for eliminating poverty, hunger, and human suffering. On the contrary, 
there is a grand failure to achieve poverty alleviation. 
The Theoretical Impasse 
Development strategies of intemarional assistance agencies have become increasing^-
complex and ineffective. Structural adjustment models used during the 1980s and 1990s to 
introduce macroeconomic reforms have instead have devastated the poor in many parts of the 
world. Social scientists are imable to explain coherently how two-thirds of world's popularion is 
affeaed by one third of its population that is better off. Post-World War II sodal science, in 
particular development sociology, has undergone numerous theoretical transformarions. 
However, the discipline has now reached a point where theoretical and conceptual innovation 
has largefy- "dried up" (Kiely, 1995, p.l). In T)evelopment: A Guide to the Ruins,' Wolfgang 
Sachs laments, ^e idea of development was once a towering monument inspiring international 
enthusiasm. Tod^, the structure is falling apart and in danger of total collapse' (1992, p. 5). 
Dudly Seers, a pioneer in development studies, declares it "over the hill and downright dead" 
(Seers, 1979,2). Adde Hoogvelt (1997) thinks development studies are so fragmented into a 
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diverse range of intellectual pursuits that thty have become redundant under sweeping forces of 
globalization. 
Theoretical development is no better for other social sciences. Economics, dominant 
in its influence on the practice of development, is equally challenged. In 1996 the 
Economist m^azine, in its cover story, debated "the mystery of economic growtL" The 
magazine reported how economists, including Noble laxureate Robert Lucas of the Universiiy of 
Chicago, are arguing wity- growth has bypassed the poor of the world. They are finally 
questioning the building blocks of growth. "After all," Lucas thinks the consequences of 
human welfare "... are simply staggering. Once one starts to think abovit them, it's hard to 
think of anything else" (Lucas, 1996, p. 25). The article is a reflection of an absolute theoretical 
confusion among concerned economists. "Understanding growth is surely the most ui^ent 
task in economics. Across the world, poverty remains the single greatest cause of misery" 
^ucas, 1996, p. 25). Not surprising!^, the article concludes by ordaining that the surest remecfy-
for poverty" is economic growth. 
For many economists (and some sociologists) up until 1997 East Asian Development' 
states provided the most recent and promising focus for theoretical renewal These "Tigprs" 
were showcased as true models of development. Current economic catastrophe in these "Tiger" 
nations however left the development economists at the Fund and the Bank without a model 
Surprisingly, they are demanding similar structural adjvistments in the former "miiade 
economies" that many developing countries have been suffering through for years. 
For economics, Heilbroner & \(Glberg (1995) provide an insightful critique. They blame 
lack of "sodality" for the failure of economic models of development. They write: 
Underfyit^ the conceptual foundations of the new classism is a denial of the sodality- not 
only of governments but of all economic agents and the markets in which thq^ 
interact... this point of view seems self contradiaory. How can a monadic entity - the 
Robinson Crusoe Concept of individual (rational choice)-serve as the basis for a sodal 
inquiry? (1995, p. 24). 
Heilbroner and Milberg (1995) argue that it's the vision that sets the stage and human 
beings are the cast of all sodal inquiry. It is this lack of recognition for sodal structural forces 
that is making growth and its consequences so unpredictable. They think that there is a general 
lack of vision in contemporary economic thought; instead there is a widespread belief that 
economic anafysis can exist as some kind of a sodally disembodied smcfy. Catherine Caufield 
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(1996) narrates in her book "Masters of Ulusion" that a fonner chief economist of the World 
Bank, Lawrence Summers, when confronted with evidence that structural adjustment was not 
working, said, "Well, the theory is right." Heilbroner and Milberg go as far as saying "At its peak 
the "high theorizing" of the present period attains a degree of unreality that can be matched only 
by medieval scholasticism" (1995, p. 4). 
The sociology of development has been excessively ineffective, but for different reasons, 
argues Hoogvelt (1997). She writes of the constructs used in development theory; 'dependency 
exploitation, unequal exchange, mode of production, modernization, rationalization, progress -
all these came under the deconstructing axe of postmodernist, post-mandst, and post 
structuralism alike* (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. xi}. She argues that in most of the sociological work in 
development studies, issues such as: debt, poverty, and peripheralization, was subsumed in 
international political economy literature. Gender relations, she thinks, provided yet another 
relief from the tedium of class relations, a dominant theme in development studies. Other 
development theorists considered poverty in developing coimtries as more damaging to earth's 
ozone layer than the pursuit of wealth in the rich worid. All this "scattered and wide terrain" of 
intellectual inquiry, Hoogvek suggests, has made the task of syntheses in development studies "a 
priori impossible." Hulme and Turner (1990) express similar concerns. They believe that there 
is no dominant paradigm at present, and sociologists studying development have abandoned the 
efforts to develop a global theory of development or underdevelopment. 
Kincaid and Portes (1994) agree with this criticism, but they go on to blame the 
"traditional parochialism" of American sociology for this state of affairs. They think that 
sociologists are rarefy- found at the forefront of the policy discussions of development because 
there is a general lack of interest amoi^ sociologists to tackle issues related to development. 
Sociologists find it safe to explain things after the fact; renderir^ their anafysis useless and 
wtthout any predictive power. Kincaid and Portes (1994) think that globalization at an 
unprecedented pace has challenged the very nature of development theory on a variety of fronts, 
yet sociologists are not getting it. Jean Baudrillard's foUowit^ quote to portray the dilemma: 
It seems that in this "capitalist" sodeiy capital can never actually be grasped in its 
present reality. It is not that oxir Marxist critics have not tried to run for it, but it alw^s 
stays a length ahead of them. By the time one phase has been unmasked, capital has 
alreacfy- passed on to another.... Capital cheats. It doesn't play by the rules of 
critique.... By reinventing capital in each successive phase on the basis of primacy of 
political econorry, [these theorists] simpfy confirm the absolute initiative capital enjoys as 
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historical event..,. And this at the same time ensures— as was perhaps their objective— 
the continuing validity of their retrospective analysis (1975, p. 25). 
Sociologists are not the only ones uneasy about trying to deal with the new realities of 
global capitalism. Economists are equally unable to come to teims with capitalism as a sodal 
order. Unperturbed with social consequences of massive globalization they continue talking in 
terms of "... impersonal, superasodal forces that imposed an objective necessity over the will of 
the aaors who operated within the economic, as contrasted with moral or social or political 
realm" (Heilbroner & Milbei^ 1995, p. 103). 
The Winds of Change 
^^{^am Greider (1997) describes globalization as: 
A wondrous machine, strong and supple, a machine that reaps as it destroys. It's huge 
and mobile, something like the machines of modem agriculture but vastfy- more 
complicated and powerful. Think of this awesome machine running over open terrain 
and ignoring familiar boundaries. It plows across fields and fencerows with a fierce 
momentum that is exhilarating to behold and also fiightening. As it goes, the machine 
throws off enormous mows of wealth and bounty while it leaves behind great furrows of 
wreck^e (p. 11). 
Greider summarize three defining trends of globalization: 1. Since 1971 major 
multinationals grew in sales fi-om $721 billion to $5.2 trillion, yet their worldwide employment 
remains fi-ozen at 26 million people. There has been a dramatic decrease in the human labor 
requirement per unit of their output. 2. Multinational's foreign direa investment quadrupled in 
the 1980s, reaching $2 trillion during the 1990s. The mon^ was spent mostfy-to disperse 
production across many nations, leading to a new global labor regime. 3. Finance capital also 
has quadrupled. The tradir^ of stacks, bonds, currencies and other finical papers has reached 
$3.6 trillion worldwide. Though Greider notes that despite the steering volume this kind of 
trading is controlled mostly by a very •nnall community of world's largest thiny to fiiiy banks and 
a handfiil of major broker^es. 
Lester C. Thurow (1996) calls this a period of "pxmctuated equilibrium,'' a term he 
borrows firom evolutionary biology. In punctuated equilibrium the environment suddenfy-
changes and evolution takes a quantum leap. Thvirow su^ests, "Biological, social, or economic 
systems enter periods of punctuated equilibrium with slowfy- evolving but firmly established 
structures. Th^ emerge fix)m periods of punctuated equilibrium with radically different 
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structures that once again begin slowly evolving" (Thurow, 1996, p. 7-8). He su^ests that there 
are five (different events (teaonic plates, as he calls them) that are reshaping the world: 1. One-
third of humanity and one-quarter of the landmass under communism has joined the old 
capitalist world. 2. There has been a technological shift to an era of "man-made brainpower 
industries" that are geographically fi-ee. 3. The world is experiencing a unique new demography^ 
the population is growing, moving, and getting older. 4. The global econonty' is growing ever 
more interconneaed, with shifts in technology, transport, and communication. "... Ar^thing 
can be made anywhere on the face of the earth and sold aitywhere else on the face of the eartL" 
5. An era is emerging where there is no dominant, economic, political, or military power 
CThurow, 1996, p. 9). Thurow's suggestion can be understood best in terms of capital having no 
boundaries. 
The winds of change are blowing strong, yet the intellectual discourse surrounding these 
events, as discussed in the previous section, is sketchy at best. Thurow compares it with the old 
Indian parable in which a dozen blind men are each feeling some part of the elephant— the tail, 
the trunk, the tusks, the ears, and reporting a very different animal. "The real elephant never 
emerges in their analysis" (Thurow, 1996, p. 3). Hoogvelt (1997) has similar concerns. She tries 
to present a picture of the whole elephant 
"It seems to me that a chief purpose should be to understand the process of crisis and 
transformation of the world economy that constitute the winds of change that are blowing 
development studies into different directions" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. xi). Preferring sociology of 
globalization to economics of globalization, she tries to make a case for what she calls a 
"Postcolonial World," a new global political economic model. 
Towards a Sociology of Globalization 
Hoogvelt thinlc.«: that the economics of globalization is driven by the faa that the world 
has reconstituted itself into a single social space, privileging sociology of globalization over 
economics of globalization. Sociologists seem to have accepted the challenge and can be 
credited for givii^ globalization a "rigoroxis and coherent theoretical status." Many sociologists 
have been contributing to the discourse. Prominent amoi^ them are Roland Robertson (1992), 
David Harvey (1989), and Anthony Giddins (1990). Hoogvelt, another sociologist, provides a 
fascinating new perspective on the sociology of globalization. Her framework is tinique in many 
w^rs, as we shall see. Hoogvelt, like most of her contemporaries, points to the fact that the 
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world is experiencing a major economic transformation and that there is a totally new political 
economy in the making. Hoogvelt, however, sees a "complete, radical break, a qualitative 
change, in the historical development of capitalism" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. xii). She thinks that 
unlike historical political economy, current political economy did not originate in the context of 
the capitalist state expanding globallj^ rather, she thinks, this new political economy is global to 
start with. The most appealing part of her argument is that the familiar pyramid of core-
periphery hierarchy is no longer a geographic, but a social, division of the world economy. She 
uses the term "Postcolonial World" as opposed to "Third World" for two reasons. First, she 
thinks that there is a shift from national origin to subjea-position in the global political 
economy. Second, she reasons, there is a movement beyond the specific historical period of 
colonialism and Third Word nationalist struggles. To understand her framework it will be useful 
to look at the origins and main historical conceptualizations of political economy. 
Origins of political econonay 
Social sciences have always been concerned with change, progress, and development. 
The initial geographical focus for such inquiry was Europe and the United States. A French 
writer, Montchretiende Watteville, writing in the earlyperiod (1615) of, the great transition from 
small primordial communities to national social formation, coined the tenn 'political economy.' 
He described it as "the science of wealth acquisition common to state as well as the Famify'' 
(Horvat, 1968, p. 611). Tolitical Economy* proved to be a concept of extra-ordinary vision 
(Hoogvelt, 1997). It not onfy- led to the emergence of economics as a sdentific discipline but it 
also, as Hoogvelt (1997, p. 3) puts it, "refleaed this discipline's preoccupation with national 
territorial accumulatiotL" 'Notational territorial accumulation' Hoogvelt describes as a process 
of continuous self-expansion of capital within territorial boimdedness. Man^^ classical authors, 
including Adam Smith and Karl Marx, had different perspectives on the relationship between 
politics and economics, but whatever the perspective, it was "shaped and cast in cement by the 
historical experience of the nation state" ^oogvelt, 1997, p. 7). 
Intemational political economy 
The stuc^ of intemational political economy evolved into three dominant perspectives. 
Hoogvelt categorize them as Realism, Institutionalism, and Stracturalism. All of these 
frameworks, nevertheless, were anchored in the historical contingency of statism. 
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Realism 
Based on mercantilist conception of political economy, realists believed in political 
power for the state through economic means. In this framework politics takes primacy and the 
nation-state is considered an actor competing with other nation states in an "anarchic 
international arena dominated by the struggle for power among states" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 7). 
International order and stability is theorized in the context of hegemoity' and balance of Power 
(Morganthau, 1948: Thompson, I960: Waltz, 1959) 
Insdtutionalism 
More in line with Adam Smith's classical liberal economics this perspective emphasizes 
interstate coordination for economic growth and promotion of a woridwide free maiket system. 
Institutionalists believe not so much in the hegemony of a single state (U.S. in a postwar stable 
world-order), rather in institutionalized intergovernmental regimes of governance and 
coordination. In the wake of increased economic interdependence this framework makes a case 
for viable international institutions like United Nations organizations and international treaties 
and regional blocs. 
Structuralism 
Derived from the Marxist notion of political economy, this framework applies the 
Nfendst conception of capitalism to international relations. Structuralists recognize that 
capitalism has become trans-sodetal, spanning all nations of the world, and looks at the 
interrelation between states as being subsidiary to the concem with the development of 
capitalism on a global scale. This fr-amewoik is unique in its recognition for the totality- of the 
world system- It challenges the assumption that development in the nation-state can be 
understood "... without taking into accoxmt the systemic ways in which these societies are linked 
to one another in the context of an ever-expanding network of material (economic) exchanges" 
(Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 8). These "trans-sodetal networks of material exchanges" are termed as 
"world-systems" in Wallerstein's (1979) work and are referred to as "global sodai formations" 
in Amin's (1980) terminology. Chase Durm (1989) calls them "global formations." 
These perspectives have made significant contributions to understand international 
political economy. The Marxist perspective brought to bare the fact that an apparentfy- free 
market could produce soda% stmctured inequality. Wallerstein extended this perspective to a 
global level by demonstratii^ that commodity production is concentrated in areas that are 
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constrained under "power relations between states." He explained how exploitation of the 
periphery is necessary to the reproduction of capitalism. 
Without denying to these perspectives their contribution in understanding linkages 
among economy, power, and politics, these frameworks have remained inherently incompatible. 
Hoogvelt points out that both Marxists and realists regard international economic outcomes as a 
redistributive, zero-sxim game, whereas liberals see it as a positive-sum game with all parties 
eventually benefiting from it. In considering the economy as shaping politics, Marxists and 
liberals line up together while realists argue differendy. Similarly realist and liberal theories 
representing "statis" and "equilibrium'' do not explain social change. This has lead to, as 
Hoogvelt explains, "sterile interpardigmatic debates" and polarization of international relations 
into separate subfields. 
Hoogvelt presents Robert Cox's (1981) "critical theory" as a solution. Cox criticizes 
conventional international relations theorists as altogether too obsessed with relations between 
states, for failing to account for trans-sodetal linkages rapidfy- emerging tod^, and for not being 
critically aware of their own historic roots. He has a different view of world order and historical 
change. He defines historical structure as "a particular configuration between ideas, institutions 
and material forces." 
Cox uses "historical structure" as "no more than a framework of action which 
constitutes the context of habits, pressures, expectations and constraints within which action 
takes place, but which does not determine action in any direct, mechanical way" (Hoogvelt, 
1997, p.ll). To Cox the concept of historical structure is far less deterministic than for most 
^ferxist, leaving room for history to develop in a variety of directions. Hoogvelt suggests that 
"the task of the critical social scientist is to uncover "plausible" alternative futures, instead of 
remaining trapped in some trans historical essentialism" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 11). Based on 
Cox's theory, Hoogvelt concludes that neither is the present forever nor, as in historical 
materialism, is the fiiture a forgone conclusion. 
Cox is critical of historical materialism for being too abstract and deterministic in 
describing the progressive transformation of modes of production as an imfolding history. He 
blames it for lack of awareness of its own historical basis and for conceptualizing institutions 
and economic structures as xinidirectionally conneaed. But, he thinks that Marxism in faa has a 
lot to offer to the theory of historical change. To Cox two of the inherent advantages of 
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historical materialism inclnde its search for contradictions in social life as a mainspring of human 
change (the principle of the dialectics) and the fact that it considers modes of production to be 
the prime mover in the changes in social forces. 
Borrowing Cox's concept of "historical structure," Hoogvelt looks at various stages of 
capitalist history as periods in which each time there was a "fit" between material conditions, 
institutions, and ideology, including the reflections and theories of the time. She thinks that it is 
the "fit" that created momentary stability at mercantile, colonial, and neocolonial phases of 
international capital accumulation. Hoogvelt does not see these stages as inevitable steps in 
some unfolding, progressive logic of capitalist history as implied in historical materialism. 
Neither does she deny the significance of historica% generated structures of deepening 
inequality in trying to understand the present crises. She provides a fascinating accoimt of 
"historic spedfidty" of the theories of imperialism, modernization, dependency, post-
imperialism, and the new international division of labor. Asserting Cox's "historical structure," 
she suggests that material, institutional and ideological elements today have led international 
capital to new heights. 
Coital is transforming to a new "fit" called globalization: some of the global aspects of 
this transformation as presented by Hoogvelt follow. 
Directional tendencies of transformation to a new "fit" 
Giddens (1990) presents the idea of "Time/Space Distantiation" as a measure of the 
level to which the "fiiction" of space has been overcome to accommodate social interaction. 
For Giddens "annihilation of space through time" is shrinking the world into a "global village:" 
Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations 
which link distant localities in such a w^ that local happenir^ are shaped by events 
occurring many miles away and vice versa (Giddens, 1990, p. 64) 
Hoogvelt argues that this means that even though we still have local lives as physical 
persons we simultaneously experience global phenomenal worlds. "It is this globalization as 
shared phenomenal worlds which tod^ drives the process of economic globalization" 
(Hoogvelt, 1997, p 120). She suggests that in the past "global integration in the sense of a 
growing unification and interpretation of the human condition" was shaped by the "economic 
logic of capital accumulation." Tod^ these things have been reversed; the human condition is 
driving the logic of future capital accumulation. This is a significant departure from traditional 
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theories of international capital. Hoogvelt suggests that time/space compression shapes the 
economics of globalization trough, first, "global market discipline," second, "flexible 
aco-imdation through global webs," and third, "global financial deepening." 
A global market discipline 
To understand global market discipline we should be able to distinguish between two 
other terms: "global market-place" and "global market principle." In Hoogvelt's words a "global 
market-place exists when there is an intemarional market exchange between different goods and 
services that are produced in different nations" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 122). This is a 
complementaiy process in which countries specialized in producing one type of produa would 
trade with other nations for goods that they do not produce. This inter-produa trade that was 
prevalent in the prewar and immediate postwar periods gradually was replaced with "intra-
produa" trade. Division of labor among nations is gradually being replaced with export 
competition between producers in different countries in the same produa line. Liberalization 
and technological progress has allowed multinationals to spread out different parts of 
production globalfy^, increasing enormously the trade in components and semi-processed 
products. This type of trade has led to structural conditions for the emergence of a global 
economy. A dominant standard of price, quality, and efficiency (the global market principle) has 
started to impose itself on an array of things including domestic supply of consumer goods, 
technology, capital, labor, and raw materiel. Hoogvelt argues that the competition resulting 
firom this shift fi-om inter-produa trade to intra-produa trade has intensified to a predatory 
leveL 
More importantfy^, the way this structural integration is being internalized in the 
behaviors of economic ^ents is leading to a "market discipline." Hoogvelt suggests that the 
awareness of this intense global competition has been heightened due to time/space 
compression. Workers can be kept in line (e.g., paid less) for fear of job losses since their 
company might move elsewhere, where wages and social conditions are less demanding. The 
point is that such discipline can be achieved by threatenii^ to move and without actualfy* doing 
so. 
Flexible accumulation through global webs 
Because, through time/space compression, state-of-the-art machinery and modem 
faaories can be installed anywhere in the world, and because global communication has become 
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as simple as a push of a button on one's computer,. Producers in the west are in direct 
competition with millions of producers around the world. Hoogvelt defines "real time" 
activities as those for which distance and location are no longer relevant. In the contea of 
today's global market she observes: 
Routine production is no longer the preserve of deskilled jobs in industrial plants. The 
fusion of computer technology with telecommimications makes it possible for firms to 
relocate an ever-widening range of operations and functions to wherever cost-
competitive labour, assets and infrastructure are available. The new technology makes it 
feasible to standardise, routinise and coordinate activities which previously were 
subjeaed to the fiiction of space and therefore regarded as non tradable. They enable 
such activities to be turned into real time activities (1997, p. 126). 
Hoogvelt argues that production capacity in certain seaors is fledble enough to be viewed as a 
commodity. Such production capacity itself is subjeaed to the global market principle. She 
describes how the application of computer-aided design (CAD) and computer numerical control 
(CNC) has allowed manufacturers to set up small production units effective '^ and economicalfy' 
with litde capital investment. Such flexible production units often are separated organizarionally 
and physically from design, marketing, and engineering and are linked to companies via an 
intranet. These units constant^" are competing with each other for subcontraaing orders. She 
calls this scenario "flexible accumulation through global webs." In other words the 
transnationals are moving from a compacy basis of organization to a loosely organized network 
of production where services can be bought for a short time. 
Hoogvelt thinks that this fusion of telecommunications and computers has allowed 
multinationals the advantages of market competition in production along with aU the advantages 
that used to be associated with productive operations by wholly-owned subsidiaries. Bvit, to 
ensure the success of these global webs some important social and institurional requisites must 
be met. Hoogvelt argues that such requisites simultaneousfy' must be regarded as structural 
consequences in which system standards and economic measures take precedence over nation-
state diversity. 
Global finandal deepening 
Hoogvelt defines financial deepening as a phenomenon "... which occurs when the 
growth of financial transaction far exceeds the growth of the underfying economic fimdamentals 
of production and trade" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 128). 
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As a result of financial deregulation and advances in telecommtinication, money 
increasingly is being made out of the very circulation of money. Most financial transactions do 
not serve what economist would call an economic function. Frederic Clairmont writes: 
Today more than at any time in capitalism's history the profits of finance capital are 
based on debt and exponential debt creation. Private, corporate, and household debt 
worldwide surpasses US$31 Trillion, galloping at a compoimd rate of over 9 percent 
yearly or three times faster than that of the world GDP and world trade. It is clear for 
whom the bell is tolling. The tocsin is heard (1996, p. 29). 
The enormous increase in international mobility of capital refers not only to the speed at 
which the money can cross borders, but Hoogvelt feels that it also refers to how the money is 
being disconneaed fi-om social relationships in which money previously was embedded. This 
has led to intensification of linkages within the core of the global system "... while its 
counterpart 'peripheralisation' becomes a process of marginalisation and expulsion that cuts 
across territories and national boundaries" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 129). Thus, Hoogvelt thinks that 
the structure of core-periphery becomes a social division rather than a geographic one. She feels 
that the speed with which money crosses fi-ontiers with a push of a button removes the need to 
embed it fiinnfy' in national or social relationships. "Globalization makes national social 
solidarity (as expressed in transfer payments to the old, the sick, the unemployed and the lower 
income groups) dysfunctional from the point of view of the rational economic interest of those 
who participate in global econon^^(Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 130). This feeling is manifest in a lai^e-
scale deregulation and privatization being pushed around the globe. 
Hoogvelt concludes by observing that globalization, pushing cross-border economic 
integration to record levels, is in fact a social phenomenon. She does not think that the world is 
a global society or a global econon^yet! To her, it's rather a process that msf or may not 
continue depending on whether narional governments resist it or go along with it. Questioning 
the skeptics in the globalization debate, she arpies that in some cases the apparent enhanced 
exercise of sovereignty and regulation on the part of national governments in fact might be 
regulation for globalizarioiL 
Global reg;ulation 
The directional tendencies discussed above provide iis a fi:^mework. of emerging 
relationships between production and consumption at the level of the international econon^ as 
a whole. These "structural properties define a set of micro- and macro-regulatory problems 
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whose resolution is crucial to long term success" ^oogvelt, 1997, p. 107). A fully established 
period of stable economic growth cannot be explained without describing the mechanisms that 
govern it. 
The regulation school, a loosely networked group of intellectuals including Michel 
AgUetta and Alan Lipietz, concerns itself with the regulation of the economy. They 
conceptualize the success and decline of capital through two key concepts: "a regime of 
accumulation" and "a mode of regulation." A regime of accumulation, defined at the level of 
international economy, is a relatively stable and reproducible relationship between production 
and consumption, the we just presented. The materialization of the regime of accumulation 
through a body of interiorized rules and social process is called the mode of regulation. A mode 
of regulation is an interaaion of norms, habits, laws, regulation networks, and so on that "ensure 
the unity of the process, that approximate consistency of individual behaviors with the schema 
of production" (Lipietz, 1986, p. 19). 
The regulation school, rooted in Marxist tradition, regards Marx's historical materialism 
as useful, but not without serious defects. To those in the regulation school there is no 
"eschatological" belief in the "forward march of history." They do not feel compelled to 
confine intellea in a predetermined course laid down in history. To them a resolution to the 
problems of the regulatory (mode of regulation) is crucial to long-term success, but is contingent 
on localfy- and historical^-spedfic outcomes and is thus unpredictable. This leads regulation 
school's approach to have merit onfy- in hindsight, a typical criticism of sociology. To overcome 
this deficiency Hoogvelt (1997) tries to present the "contotirs" of a mode of regulation 
corresponding to globalization (the emerging mode of accumulation). She presents three key 
domains in which emei^ent forms of global regulation already may be discovered. These 
domains are: (1) capital-state relations; (2) capital-labor relations, and (3) core-periphery 
relations. 
Capital-state relations 
Robert Cox (1981) describes the nation state as having the internationalized under 
globalization, wherein state has become a vehicle of transmitting global market discipline to the 
international economy. Hoogvelt thinks that a transnational business culture has emei^ed that 
carries "shared norms and values that underpin and interweave with the structural power of 
transnational capital" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 134). These forces, Hoogvelt feels, are becoming 
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increasingly instimtionalized in an array of organizational forms and institutional practices: at the 
international level as the Worid Bank and the IMF; at and tlie level of interstate summit agendas 
and agreements such as GATT. She feels that elite interaction at an international level between 
a global business class, state bureaucrats, and members of international organizations is being 
crystallized into institutional forms. 
The core of their 'neo-liberal' agenda is that private property and accumulation are 
"sacrosanct" and that governments should ensure "sound finance" with contained inflation, an 
attractive business climate, and controlled labor unions. Unlike previous liberalism that also 
supported the free market and internationalization of capital, today's liberalism is unembedded, 
transcending the sovereignty of the state. Examples include: "trade related investment measures' 
(TRIMS) and "trade related intellectual property rights' (TEUPS), enforceable throxigh the 
Uruguay GATT agreement. Both agreements seriously curtail the abiHiy of the nation states to 
take domestic measures perceived important for development. These restrictions apply on local 
content recpiirements, domestic sales requirements, trade balancing requirements, and any 
remittances and sales restrictions. Hoogvelt notes that transnational capital has gone beyond 
just informing the poliq^ agenda of deregulation. Privatization is being imposed on developii^ 
countries trough various means in the policy framework of 'structural adjustment.' 
Capital-labor relation 
Globalfy- unemployment is on the rise, and an estimated 700 million workers are 
underemployed (International Labor Office, 1994), earning incomes that do not allow them to 
reach a minimum standard of living. This includes 35 million registered unemployed in core 
countries. Hoogvelt describes how the debate on global employment patterns revolves aroimd 
"relocation," the extent to which the jobs from core countries are beii^ relocated to the 
periphery, and "restructuring" wherein core manufacturir^ activities are being either shed or 
"externalized" to producer "service" activities. It's a difficult debate since "tod^s advanced 
information-driven production systems have rendered the conceptual distinction between capital 
and labour crude to the point of useless" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 140). 
Peter Druker (1993), John Naisbitt (1994,1996), Paul Krugman (1996), and other 
information society- theorists aipie that tod^ the value of capital and labor is beir^ replaced by 
knowledge and information. Hoogvelt agrees that knowledge has become a "key, independent, 
source of added value." She, however, feels that the value of information and knowledge is not 
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replacing the significance of traditional factor of production, and that instead its a forth faaor 
alongside the conventional trio of capital, labor and land (raw materials). Kno'wdedge is, in 
Hoogvelt's words, a very fungible fourth factor, for when applied with traditional faaors of 
production it releases them for other uses. For example, computer-driven technologies reduce 
capital cost. Also, unlike other factors, information and knowledge increase with use. 
Traditionally knowledge was considered organizationally embedded as mental labor. From a 
Marxist perspective white-collar staff were no different fi-om blue-collar staff with capital, in the 
course of production, extracting surplus value from either. 
Tod^, however, the fusion of telecommum'cations and computers, electrom'c data 
transmission, video conferencing, and other advances have enabled knowledge workers to be 
unembedded from the organization. Firais can externalize employment. "Many employees are 
either being replaced by outside contraaors, or becoming contraaors themselves, or staff 
departments are being spun-off as independent contraaors and consultancies" (Hoogvelt, 1997, 
p. 142). To coordinate human activities in the new circumstances created by global capitalism, 
new forms of regulation are emerging. ISO 9000 is an example. The ISO 9000 series of 
standards allows standardized commumcarion among independent firms and their suppliers 
around the world. Charles Sabel writes: 
By linking learning to monitoring the new institutions (for example ISO 9000) allow 
initialfy" waiy partners to begin cooperating in ways which may eventually so align their 
understanding of the world and so their mutual interests that they may come to trust 
each other in ways not contemplated at the start (1994, p. 137). 
Core-periphery relations and the politics of exclusion 
In a value-added chain at each stage of production the labor involved adds value to the 
process of transformation from raw material to a finished good. Similarfy- at each stage the 
capitalist entrepreneur adds a mark-up to earn profit for themselves. This implies that the 
market price for the final product is an accumulation of all the wages and mark-ups of all the 
previous stages. Hoogvelt argues that traditionally multinationals have tried to internalize all 
these stages within its own "organizational embrace." But, tod^, through global networking 
same multinationals are trying to externalize all or many of these st^es and transactions. 
Hoogvelt points to another important charaaer of the value-added chain. She describes 
how the historical development of capitalism on a. world scale was organized so that the higher 
value acriviues in a value-added chain were concentrated at the final, consumer, end of the chain. 
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typically the consumer madkets in the rich coimtries. This would leave low-value activities in the 
underdeveloped parts of the world. This meant that the more specialized the final product, at 
the rich consumer end of the chain, the higher the product mark-up. Hoogvelt suggest this is 
changing. Technological advances have made it possible to 'slice-up' the value chain so that the 
labor intensive production of skilled, capital, and technology-intensive tasks can be set up in 
low-wage locations. 
Thus, the global division of labors is rendering a core-periphery relationship that cuts 
across national and geographic botmdaries, bringing on board within the core, segments 
of the Third World, and rdegating segments and groups in both the traditional core of 
the system and in the Third World to peripheral status. Core-periphery is becoming a 
social relationship, and no longer a geographic one (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 145). 
Hoogvelt think that many high-value-added activities that are contributed by 
'disembodied knowledge workers' are not only 'externalized,' but are extremely mobile. This she 
thinks would make the core-periphery relationship more uneven. "Knowledge workers," 
including marketing experts, computer consultants, financial accountants, and top managers can 
relocate globalfy- for the highest price for their services. It's noteworthy that The United States 
Congress has shown willingness to relax immigration restrictions for such individuals. On the 
other end of tbe production chain, though, capital is more mobile than labor. Labor is tied to its 
location with harsh and stria imm^ration regulations. David Harvey (1989) sees free capital 
movement giving the international bourgeoisie a decisive advantage over the mass of workers 
who are restriaed in their movements and migration by the passport they carry. 
Wallerstein (1979), in his discussion on the emergence of semi-peripheral nations as a 
go-between core and periphery, describes how these nations tend to think of themselves 
primarify" as better off than the lower seaor rather than worse off from the upper seaor. They 
were both exploiters and the exploited providing a buffer to the core gainst the feared revolt of 
the periphery. At the same time this middle l^er provided some upward and downward 
mobility' of nations providir^ the world a cfynamic equilibrium allowing reproduction of the 
overall core-periphery hierarchy over time. 
Hoogvelt explains how Will Hutton's (1995) 30/30/40 description of British society- fits 
the description of global society where core-periphery is a division that cuts across nations. 
Hutton outlines an emerging British sodety" where there is a bottom 30 per cent of unemployed 
and economical '^ inactive marginalized and disadvantaged persons. Another 30 per cent is 
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consatuted of those employed in forms of employment that are structurally insecure. The final 
40 per cent have tenured jobs with considerable security. Hoogvelt includes individuals with 
income from capital investment in this last category as well. Hutton argues that this is an 
inefficient system of running a state, and Hoogvelt agrees, but she thinks it works for global 
capitalism. There are similar three-tier structures growing up in other nations, developed and 
imderdeveloped alike. She thinks the difference between underdeveloped and developed 
countries is found solely in the size of various segments. The excluded seaor in the Third 
World often approaches 50 per cent, with a middle band of between 20 to 30 per cent. 
Global competition pits members of the middle sector against each other. Hoogvelt 
thinks it happens both between and within nations. Pro-flexibility and anti-union legislation 
aggravate the situation even further. Without any means to organize, under constant fear of the 
future, constant high structural unemployment, and a visible presence of a disadvantaged group, 
keeps the middle stratum in check. "For its part, the firee mobility of capital, coupled with the 
existence of a global market and global labour pools, removes the need for capital to worry 
about the reproduction of laboxir power or domestic markets" ^oogvelt, 1997, p. 148). 
Hating on the current development agenda Hoogvelt suggests that the key to the 
preservation of the new emerging order is not an economic problem but a law-and-order 
problem, "It's a problem of how to deal with the excluded segment of the society" (Hoogvelt, 
1997, p. 148). Shooting of street children in Brazil and Columbia, anti immigration laws and the 
policing of Mediterranean waters around "Fortress Europe," and the policy of mass 
incarceration in the United States are all forms of exclusion to Hoogvelt. She sees it happening 
in the politics of AIDS research, where 90 per cent of research and investment is spent on the 
development of drugs for the treatment of the 8 percent of people who have AIDS in developed 
countries. Funds and research agendas for cheap vacdnes to prevent the spread of ADDS in 
developing coimtries are snuffed out. She quotes a Worid Bank official; "if AIDS falls 
disproportionatefy- on the poor in these countries than the faa that they will die of it will have a 
positive impaa on the economic growth of these nations" (The batde for aids, 1995). Subtler 
and less immediatefy- visible forms of exclusion include the privatizarion of public space, and the 
introduction of private security. Hoogvelt talks about how the constitutional^- secured n^ts of 
the citizen in the UK for firee access to the "Queen's H^hway' are fi-equently violated by keeping 
out the section of "imwanted public" on private orders. On June 10,1999 the US. Supreme 
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Court overturned a similar Chicago anti-gang law. The law allowed Chicago police to break up 
groups of people loitering in public if the police officers believed they were street gang 
members. She talks about still more subde ways in which the politics of exclusion is being 
introduced in the discourse of local community politics in the concepts and practices of 
commvinity development, commimity management, community capacity building, and 
community enterprise, community development corporations. Hoogvelt writes about these 
programs: 
They are in tune with the neo-liberal governments, call for greater self-help, active 
citizenship and a reduced dependency on the state. They have rightly been condemned 
for calling upon people with the fewest resources to help those most in need. They have 
also, thus far, failed to make a dent in the spiral of job losses caused by globalisation, and 
their contribution in economic terms is extremely mai^al. But they have one great 
merit, namely of organising the poor and the marginalised to care for and control 
themselves" (1997, p. 149). 
So far we have discussed consequences of globalization at three different levels: 1. 
Capital-state relations. 2. Capital-labour relations. 3. Core-periphety relations. In looking at the 
more recent development agenda in the context of globalization Hoogvelt (1997) notes that the 
donors have adopted a new approach in which cultural pluralism has replaced universalistic 
preoccupation and goals of the past. Previous^, development was theorized as a process of 
societal convergence between hierarchically conceptualized state societies (rich-poor^ developed-
underdeveloped). Under new discourse on development dvil society and democratization in the 
periphety is being promoted in the same vfzf as it supplies the motivation and operational logic 
for multicultural activities at home. "In the West, cultural pluralism, or multiculturalism, has 
been the liberal establishment's answer to racism. That is to say, it has replaced biologically-
derived notions of racial superioritywith an appreciation of cultural differences" (1997, p 179). 
But this, Hoogvelt suggests also has a darker oppositional structure of beliefs labeled "the new 
racism" (Duffield, 1994). The "new racism" literature contends that pluralism is in faa radsm in 
a politica%-correct guise. It determines an individual's identity and personal worth by 
ethnic/racial membership and holds that all cultures are of equal worth, regardless of their moral 
views or how th^* treat people. In multiculturalism, ethnic identity is considered to be a central 
factor in social poliqr decisions. This strains a society by transformir^ it into a collection of 
separatist groups competing with each other for power and resources (Berliner & Hull, 1999, 
p.46). 
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The assximption that cultural differences are natural and unavoidable provide legitimacy 
to the notion that cultural differences are immutable and innate (Hoogvelt, 1997). This 
inevitably leads to inter-ethnic conflict in marginal areas of global economy. The promotion of 
a competitive free market with an edge over an increasing^- weak centralized state adds to the 
dilemma. Similar observations are made by the United Nations Research Institute for Sodal 
Development (UNRISD) in a report called "States of Disarray: The Social Effects of 
Globalization" (UNRISD). The report states that the recent economic restructuring, political 
change, and technological development have reduced the effectiveness of many of the 
institutions that provided social and economic security in the post-war years. One complex and 
dangerous consequence is that the identities of all peoples are challenged and as a result they 
often feel threatened, leading to a rise in xenophobic, racist, and generally discriminatory 
attitudes. This results in both direct and indirea conflia and competition. 
Africa provides a case in point. Dr. WMJ. van Binsbergen at the African Center in the 
Netherlands, siiggests that traditional notions of locality, group identity, culture, and 'tradition' 
in African society need to be reconsidered. Binsbergen describes how arms transfers and 
trafficking under globalizing influences and under conditions of scarcity, insecurity, and conflia 
are having a devastating IrapstO. on Sub-Saharan Africa. For the first time since 1989, Africa has 
more armed conflicts than any other continent. Defining a "major anned conflia" as one with 
at least 1,000 battle-related deaths, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
identified 11 major conflicts in Africa in 1998. Dr. Binsbergen notes that during that year 
approximately 8.1 million of the roughfy- 22 million refiigees in the world were in Africa. Still 
millions more Africans are internally displaced. 
The (Bureau of African Affairs, 1999) estimates that in the late 1990s wars in Africa 
increasingfy- had taken on a regional charaaer, especially in the greater Horn, the Great Lakes 
region, and southern Afiica. Large-scale wars were ongoing in Angola, Qjc^o-Brazzaville, 
Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan, as of mid-1999. The bureau 
further notes that low-intensity conflicts plague several countries, including Burundi, Chad, 
Djibouti, Senegal, and Uganda- It suggests that other coimtries suffer from internal instabilities, 
which could evolve into greater dvil strife. The bureau's report holds the proliferation of light 
weapons, financed by cash, diamonds, or other commodities, responsible for Africa's wars. 
However, Binsbei^en thinks that the causes are more sociological and economiq the trafficking 
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of weapons and the illegal trade of diamonds, etc,, have, merely prolonged these conflicts and 
made them more lethal Similar conflicts in Europe and other parts of the world may not also 
be separated from the process and evolution of globalization. 
Similar questions can be raised pertaining to pluralism and democracy. One may ask as 
to how has the existence of permanent "included" and "excluded" groups affected the ability of 
democratic structures to persist? If groups are defined in terms of ethnicity, not in terms of 
interests, what implications do this hold for democratic theory? How will newly democratic 
societies deal with these issues? 
We refer, once again to the UNRISD's assertion that new base for solidarity must be 
developed to replace older institutions. The concept of global citizenship, with equality- of 
rights, political participation and responsibility is crudal in developing effective and equitable 
global governance. 
Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation contains two papers prepared for submission to Journals. A general 
conclusion follows the second paper. References dted in the general introduction and 
conclusion chapters are listed at the end of the dissertation. 
Paper 1. Development sociology, globalization, and the politics of exclusion 
Using Robert GJX'S concept of Mstorical Structures one can argue that until! aboiff 
1970, the material conditions and social forces shaped a view of the world order that was 
geographic core-periphery hierarchy, pyramidal in shaped (Hoogvelt, 1997). An array of 
development theories, often conflicting, debated the pros and cons of this pyramid. Despite 
divergent views, there was a consensus that all human beings have a right to share the benefits of 
technological and economic progress. The state was considered central as an agent of 
development and most theorists ai^ed that the capital has an inherent drive for expansion and 
incorporation. 
Globalization has rearranged the world economic architecture. The architecture of new 
economic social and power relations is being hotfy* debated. Hoogvek's (1997) representation of 
this new order consists of a three-tier structure of concentric circles. AU three circles cut across 
national and regional boxmdaries. The core circle consists of some 20 percent of the world's 
bankable population, including the global elite fi-om across nations and regions. The second tier 
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of the global population consists of 20 to 30 percent of workers and their families who labor in 
insecure forms of employment, "thrown into cut throat competition in the global market. State 
of the art technology, frenzied capital mobiliiy and neo-liberal policies together ensure both a 
relentless elimination of jobs by machines, and a driving down of wages and sodal conditions to 
the lowest global denominator" (Hoogvelt 1997, p. 240). The lai^est and the last concentric 
circle comprise effectively excluded masses, "performing neither a productive function, nor 
presenting a potential consumer market in the present stage of high-tech information-driven 
capitalism" For now there is no theory or program to include them in the universal progress. 
"Developmentalism is dead, containment and exclusion rule OK!" (1997, p. 240). 
We took up this last assertion regarding those who effective^- are alreac^ excluded from 
the global system in the first paper "Development Sociology, Globalization, and the Politics of 
Exclusion." We argue in this paper that the context of development has changed considerably 
since the rise and fall of modernization, world system, and dependency theories. Poverty and 
increasing inequality needs to be reconsidered in the context of a new globalized world 
economy. At the same time the relationship between production and consumption under 
globalization— its regime of accumulation— has changed dramatically. Also, interaction of 
norms, habits, laws, regulation networks, and so on—its "mode of regulation" is changing 
accordingly. These regulations, we argued, are alreacfy^iofluencing capital-state relations, capital-
labor relations, and relations between core and periphery classes within as well as between 
nation-states. We then tested whether the current development agenda and financial assistance 
are in fact just another mode of regulation that is facilitating globalization and as a consequence 
undermining human development in low-to low-middle-income coimtries. 
Paper 2. Ethnic attitudes in Pakistan 
Hoogvelt (1997, p.240) uses the term "Postcolonial World." to capture the notion that 
the distina social formations which have emerged in the current world order "are a result of the 
way in which the aftermath of colonialism interacting with the forces of globalization and 
responds to it." She presents various situations and options that are present in different parts of 
this Postcolonial World. One such situation that we discussed earlier was the ethnic strife, dvil 
collapse, instability, and anarcty in various parts of the world as a result of the external and 
internal forces of globalization. Pushing the multiculturalism that is manifest in the new 
development agenda translates into "new racism" in developing countries, where the individual 
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identities are challenged, leading to a rise in xenophobic, radst, and generally discriminatory 
attitudes. Oises in Bosnia and Kosovo are clear examples of the failure of pluralistic idealism 
under the strains of globalization and structural adjustment. Most multi-ethnic societies with 
fragile social and political orders are alw^ at the door of dvil collapse, and instability. We 
contend that further peripheralizing of their economies under emerging international practices 
of conditionally, development aid, and humanitarian relief apparently intended for man^ement 
and containment rather than incorporation (Hoogvelt, 1997) can lead these societies to outright 
anarchy. 
The second paper here is an effort to understand ethnic relations in one such multi­
ethnic state, Pakistan. Pakistan is a nation on a tightrope; its economy at the verge of economic 
bankruptcy, and its political system nearfy- collapsed. Recently the democratically eleaed 
government was toppled in a military coup and the nation's future hinges precariously on 
economic recovery. 
The paper presents a pilot stucfy* at a micro-level, testing whether Punjabi students in 
Pakistan share, as a group, an ethnic hierarchy and exb"brt the same types of prejudice found in 
the pluralistic West. The sample is 192 students at the Punjab College of Business 
Administration in Lahore in 1996. The students responded to a questionnaire in English, with 
questions nearfy" identical to those previousfy-used by American and Dutch researchers. 
Principal components analysis is used to measure respondents' consensus on an ethnic hierarchy 
of out-groups in social distance. Faaor anafysis is used to determine how these students 
distir^;uished among aversive, symbolic, and biological prejudice parallel to American and Dutch 
results. Discussion centers on reasons that a shared ethnic hierarchy and types of prejudice 
found in Western countries appear in this Islamic country as well 
ImpKcations of ethnic relations under globalization and gmeling aid conditionaliiy can 
be wide-ranging and dangerous. According to the United Nations' assessment there are 200 
armed conflicts in the world today. "A vast majority of these are ethnic conflicts, some of 
which are by far the most destructive and dangerous of all forms of human cruelty. In many 
countries in Africa ethnic groups are pitted against one another. (UNESCO, 1998). Such 
conflicts generate "ethnic emotions which empower a people to collective '^perform acts of 
unbelievable cruelty and sav^ery" (Bailey, 1994, p 5). Recognizingthe significance of the issue, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural organization (UNESCO) has setup 
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ETHNO-NET-AFRICA, a network of African sodal sdentisc monitoring and evaluating 
ethnic conflicts and sodal change in Africa. Focusing on current sodal transformation 
AFRICA-NET seeks to fill in knowledge gaps through research with a view to establishing a 
reliable database on ethnidiy. At ETHNO-NET-AFRICA, a network of African scholars learn 
from each other's experiences and provide a vital earfy-warning system on ethnic conflia. In 
the absence of such projects in South Asia, this paper provides a vital imrial study to chart the 
dynamics of ethnic relations in Pakistan. 
Limited availabiliiy of resources, which is addressed in the first paper, is at^ed to 
amplify ethnic strife among exduded dasses of less income countries. 
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DEVELOPMENT SOCIOLOGY, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE POLITICS OF 
EXCLUSION 
A paper to be submitted to the Sociological Quarterly 
Rehan MuUick 
Abstract 
We tested a new perspective on the sociology of globalization that assumes increasing 
inequality across the world is a consequence of an emerging global economy rather than an 
outcome of underdevelopment. The sample included 126 countries classified as low-income to 
low-middle-income countries by the World Bank Regression anafysis revealed support for a 
postcolonial paradigm on globalization, suggesting exclusion by design of peripherized masses 
in developing countries. Discussion centers on reconsidering the nature of globalized 
capitalism to imderstand an impasse in development and development studies. 
Introductioa 
There are more poor in the world today than 50 years ago. Poverty is proportionately 
increasing around the world and even in industrialized coxmtries. The United Nations declared 
1996 the "International Year for the Eradication of Poverty." In a report issued on the 
occasion, "Poverty and development: an (im)balance sheet" (United Nations, 1996), the world 
bocfy" admitted; "Poverty remains, endangerii^ both the people and the planet...The report 
states that income disparities between the richest 20 percent and the poorest 20 percent of the 
world's popxaladon doubled fi-om 1960 to 1991. Eight hundred million people, including 
children, are chronically undemourished. The world's poorest 50 coimtries account for less 
than 2 percent of the world's income. More than a billion people in developing countries live 
in absolute poverty makii^ less than $1 a day each. In South Asia, home to nearfy' half of the 
world's poor, the situation is even worse. !^fchbub ul Haq (1995), fomier director of the 
Human Development Report at the UN, observers, "South Asia is fast emerging as the poorest, 
the most illiterate, the most malnourished, the least gender sensitive - indeed the most deprived 
region in the world" (1993, p. 5). la South Asia 800 million do without elementary sarutaiion, 
380 million are illiterate, and 300 million drink from ponds rather than taps. Haq (1995) 
concludes that the scale of social depravation and hiiman despair is tremendous. 
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Ironically, the majority of the world's population today lives in more and more suffering 
amidst more and more wealtL Today, more than ever before, technological breakthroughs and 
the labor of billions of individuals have made enough progress to eliminate poverty, hunger, 
and hiiman suffering. But although the world is economically integrated to an imprecedented 
extent, it is beset by increasingly desperate conditions of national existence and prospects for 
change (Kincaid & Portes, 1994). For maity- in the developing world the situation is perplexing. 
In the past two decades developing covmtries have acquired four times more debt in the form 
of development assistance yet poverty and suffering continue to rise. The efforts to develop 
the world, obviously, have not yielded much. 
Gsnsequently, the very concept of development is being challenged. In, 
"Development: A Guide to the Ruins" Wolfgang Sachs laments, "the idea of development was 
once a towering monument inspiring international enthusiasm. Today, the structure is falling 
apart and in danger of total coU^se" (1992, p. 5). Dudly Seers, a pioneer in development 
studies, declares it "over the hill and downright dead' (Seers, 1979, p. I). 
Development theories play an essential role in explaining international disparities in 
wealth, standard of living, and economic growtk Modernization theory sought diffusion and 
adoption of Western values and social and structural charaaeristics for the realization of 
economic development The theory has been critidzed for being teleological and ethnocentric, 
oversimplifying reality (Gunder Frank, 1971). Dependency and the world-system theories that 
succeeded modernization theory rejected the modernization view that national development 
covild be explained by looking at internal characteristics of the nation-states. Instead, nation-
states were seen as open systems, heavify influenced by economic forces and patterns of 
exchai^e at the international leveL 
More recentfy, though, the world economy is experiencii^ rapid and unpredictable 
changes. Latin American debt crises, Sub-Saharan African reversal of development, de-
industrializarion in some western states and the surprisingly successful mcxlel of export-lead 
growth in East Asia are all examples of sharp variations in a globalized economy that can no 
longer be explained easify by dependency and the worid system theories. It seems that the 
(fynamics of development, as th^ relate to contemporary capital, have st^ed a "length ahead" 
of its "intellectual piarsuers." C^italism, instead of destroying itself in consequence of its 
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systematic internal contradictions (as predicted by some of the contemporary theories), once 
again has overcome the self-infliaed crises by total renewal. 
Kincaid and Portes (1994) assert that globalization at an unprecedented pace has 
challenged the very nature of development theory on a variety of fronts. They believe that the 
study of development is crucial because development theory and the notion that development 
can be realized are normatively related. They are, however, concerned that the "traditional 
parochialism' is making American sociology ignore development theory. They think that 
sociologists rarefy" are found at the forefront of the policy discussions of development becaiase 
there is a general lack of interest among them to tackle issues related to development. 
Sociologists find it safe to explain things after the fact, rendering their analysis useless and 
without any predictive power. 
There is, thus, a need and a sense of urgency for exploring newer models of 
development that extend the comprehension of development beyond the geographic 
boimdaries of the Third World. Such models, they suggest, should be engaged in the 
understanding and improvement of human economic and social condition within the context 
of a globalized world econony. 
A World of Transformations 
We live in a world of transformations affecting almost every aspect of what we do. As 
Anthory Giddens puts it, "For better or for worse, we are being propelled into a global order 
that no one fully understands, but which is making its effects felt upon all of us" (Giddens, 
1999). Ankie Hoogvelt (1997) describes globalization as intensification of human interaction 
across borders and at all levels— financial, social, and cultural Lester C. Thurow (1996, p. 49) 
calls Globalization a period of "punctuated equilibrium," a term he borrows from evolutionary 
biology. In punctuated equilibrium the environment suddenfy- changes and evohmon takes a 
quantum leap. Thurow su^ests, "Biological, social, or economic systems enter periods of 
punctuated equilibrium with slowfy- evolvir^ but firmfy- established structures. They emei^e 
from periods of pxmctuated equilibrium with radically different structures that once again begin 
slowfy- evohring" (^tirow, 1996, pp. 7-8). He suggests that there are five different events 
(tectonic plates, as he piits it) that are reshaping the world. 1. One-third of humanity and one-
quarter of the landmass under communism has joined the old capitalist world. 2. There has 
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been a technological shift to an era of "man made brainpower industries" that are 
geographically free. 3. The world is experiencing a unique new demography, the population is 
growing, moving, and getting older. 4. The global economyis growing ever more 
interconneaed, with shifts in technology, transport, and communication. "... anything can be 
made anywhere on the face of the earth and sold anywhere else on the face of the earth." 5. 
An era is emerging where there is no dominant economic, political, or military power (Thurow, 
1996, p. 9). Although one might question Thurow's assessment of military dominance he 
seems to be correct in noting that globalization has added to the complexity of the analytical 
task for development specialists. 
Shifts in economic policies and organizational structures as a result of the 1970s and 
1980s economic stagnation and debt crisis proved to be a major catafyst for globalization. The 
economic policy tilted in favor of marka forces and private enterprise. Broadly consistent 
throughout the world, the new economic policy emphasized restoring economic equilibrium 
through liberalization of markets— including capital markets, reduction of state intervention in 
the economy, privatization of a broad range of enterprises, and reduction of government 
expenditures— often including cuts in social services and in subsidies on consumer goods. In 
many countries, these changes have been brought about under pressure from international 
creditors and through the design of structural adjustment programs. 
The consequences of rapid globalization for development are staggering. Globalization 
alreac^ has undermined national sovereignly - not onfy-in domestic macro-economic 
management of fiscal and monetary policy, but also in loss of sodal policy options in health, 
education, safety nets, employment, environment, and even the values and culture of citizens 
(United Nations, 1999). Expanding inequality has become the most serious problem facing 
world society (Giddens, 1999). The UN's Human Development Report, 1999 notes that gaps 
are widening both between and within coimtries. East Asia has made considerable 
improvement in per capita income, while in Sub-Saharan African and other least developed 
coimtries, per capita incomes have dropped compared to what they were in the 1970s. In 
Eastern Europe inequality has risen at the fastest rate ever, wtth Russia leading. In this region 
the income share of the richest 20% is 11 times that of the poorest 20%. The report states that 
the inequality has grown markedfy" even in East Asian economies that have achieved high 
growtL A similar trend is reported for the most industrialized OECD (Oi^anizarion for 
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Economic Co-Operation and Development) countries, with the worst deterioration in Sweden, 
the United Kingdom, and The United States. In the United Kingdom the number of families 
below the poverty line rose by 60% in the 1980's, in the Netherlands by nearly 40%. 
The report contrasts these developments against the fact that the net worth of the 
world's 200 richest people increased from $440 billion to more then $1 trillion in just the four 
years from 1994 to 1998. The assets, informs the report, of the three richest people were more 
than the combined GNP of the 48 least developed countries. The richest 20% in the world 
share 86% of the world's GDP, 82% of exports of goods and services, 68% of foreign direa 
investment, and 93.3% of Internet use. Worsening inequality was reported in Eastern Europe 
where the changes were the fastest ever recorded, "In less then a decade income inequality as 
measured by Gini coefficient increased from an average of 025-0.28 to 0.35-0.38, surpassing 
OECD levels. The process is "... concentrating power and marginalizing the poor both 
countries and people" (United Nations, 1999, p. 30). 
The theoretical impasse 
Analysis of the development process, so far, has relied heavily on three approaches -the 
modernist, the realist, and the dependency/world system perspective. Modernization theory, 
synoitymous with the neoclassical tradition of economic growth, was based on the notion of a 
dichotomy between traditional and modem societies. Conceptualized in essentialfy- Weberian 
terms, modernization sees most Third World societies resembling traditional ideal-type pre-
state, pre-raiional and pre-industrial societies (Wallerstein, 1995). From a modernization 
perspective, for development to take hold. Third World societies have to pass through various 
st^es of diffusion and the adoption of Western values and social and stractural charaaeristics. 
The theory also assumed that each state operated autonomously and was substantially 
unaffeaed by faaors external to its borders. Modernization further presumed the so-called 
stages of development to be a general law of social development. Wallerstein (1995) describes 
these stages as dubious and totaify- unproven premises. To him, the political implications of 
such an approach were obvious. "If a state at a so-called lower stage wanted to resemble a state 
at a so-called advanced stage in terms of prosperity and internal political profile, it had best 
copy the pattern of the advanced state, and impHcitfy- therefore had best follow the advice of 
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that state" (Wallerstein, 1995). This ethnocentrism manifest in modemizarion theory, along 
with other factors, eventually led to its decline and demise. 
Both the worid system and the dependency theories work at the intemarional level of 
analysis, with nation-states as the interacting parts of a lai^er system. This world social system 
operates in the context of "production for sale in a market in which the objea is to realize the 
maximum profit" (Wallerstein, 1979, p. 15). This world economy dictates various "modes of 
labor control" (Wallerstein, 1974). Dynamics of these models are derived from social 
stratification and class relations in a stratified society. Like individuals, nation-states occupy 
class-like structural positions in the world economy. At the top of the hierarchy are the "core" 
advanced capitalist states of North America and Western Europe. Charaaerized by military 
strength, political power, specialized production, and high per capita income, these core states 
dominate the militarily weak and poor "peripheral" nations of the South. Somewhere between 
the core and the periphery are the "semi-peripheral" states with strong governments and 
increasing industrialization. The peripheral states are the most exploited; the semi-peripheral 
states are both exploiters and exploited and buffer the core from the periphery. 
These theories are credited for their insight on how the present crises can emerge 
through historically generated structures of deepening inequality (Hoogvelt, 1997). Societies do 
not develop in isolation, bvit instead are embedded in systems that are impaaed by external 
forces (Kincaid & Portes, 1994). But, these theories have their limitations. For instance, 
Hoogvelt does not see the stages of development—periphery, semi periphery, and core— as 
inevitable steps in some unfolding, progressive logic of capitalist history. Some 
underdeveloped Asian states have made considerable progress toward industrialization while 
other Ladn American countries poised to become semi-periphery states fell back under 
crushing debt. Similarly, both dependency and world system theories, staying within the 
Marxist tradition, build on the assumption of capitalism as an ongoing expanding project imtil 
is possible collapse. Empirical facts, however, do not support the ar^;ument of continued 
expansion and incorporation. On the contrary, intemarional forms of connectivity' increasing^-
have concentrated capital within a (reconstitutec^ core (Hoogvelt, 1997). Other themes used in 
these theories— dependency, exploitation, unequal exchange, mode of production, 
modernization, rationalization, progress— all have been crippled by the de-constructionist ax of 
postmodernist, post-Marxist, and post-structuralists alike ([effe, 1998). 
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Also, the concepts pertaining to development—debt, poverty, and peripherization, were 
aU subsumed in the International Political Economy literature. This has a limited analysis of 
development at the nation-state level only. Lately, gender relations, too, have been separated 
from class relations— a dominant theme in development studies. Similarfy-, other development 
theorists consider poverty in developing countries as more damaging to earth's ozone layer 
than is the pursuit of wealth in the rich world. According to Hoogvelt (1997), all this 'scattered 
and wide terrain' of intellectual inquiry has made the task of syntheses in development studies 'a 
priori impossible.' She thinks development studies are so fr^mented into a diverse range of 
intellectual pursuits, that it has become redundant imder sweeping forces of globalizaa'on. 
Hulme and Turner (1990) express similar concerns. They believe that there is no dominant 
paradigm at present, and sociologists stucfying development have abandoned efforts to develop 
a global theory of development or underdevelopment. Because development theories play an 
essential role in explaining international disparities in wealth, standard of living, and economic 
growth, sociologists, to become more relevant to the people, governments, and those involved 
in development, must keep the analytical pace with sudden shifts in the nature of global capital. 
The faa that a new kind of worid economic and political system charaaerized both by 
unprecedented unity and unprecedented fragmentation has commenced; requires new modes of 
analysis and new theories. There is a need for readiness to tear down intellectual barriers and 
bring together mary approaches, methods, and disciplines that for too long have been apart. 
What is needed is a new approach to development that combines the breadth of vision of the 
classical political economy of the l9th century with the anal^cal advances of twentieth-century 
social science. Focus must shift from growth to inequaliiy-the structures and processes of the 
world system, which produce distributional outcomes charaaerized by uneven development 
and wide variations in the wealth and poverty of particular regions, sectors, classes, and states. 
A postcolonial approach to development 
Ankie Hoogvelt (1998) presents one such approach that moves beyond the debate 
between modernization and dependency theories, with their deterministic assumptions about 
the inevitability of progress or backwardness, development or underdevelopment. She assesses 
responses by individuals and groups to the constraints and opportunities being created by new 
global economic structures, and by rapidfy- changing identities and roles. Hoogvelt explores the 
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emerging strategic networks of regional production and political and economic regulation, and 
the new social divisions that cut across territories and national boundaries. 
Hoogvelt (1997) agrees that historical '^ generated structures of deepening inequality 
have contributed greatly to the present crises, but she does not see various stages of capitalism 
as inevitable steps in some unfolding, progressive logic of capital history as implied in historical 
materialism. Following Robert Cox's (1981) concept of "historical structure," she describes 
various stages of capitalist history— mercantile, colonial, neocolonial— as periods of relative 
capital stability resulting from momentary equilibrium (a fit) between material conditions, 
institutions, ideologies, and theories of the time. This relative stability of a period of capitalism 
and then its transformation into a new configuration depend upon a combination of 
arrangements, what the regulation school describes as, "a regime of accumulation" and "a 
mode of regulation" ^pietz, 1986). A "regime of accumulation" is a relatively stable and 
reproducible relationship between production and consumption and the materialization of the 
regime of accumulation throxigh a body of interiorized rules and social process is considered 
the "mode of regulation." 
From this perspective, current material conditions, institutions, ideologies, and theories 
have created a momentary stability favoring a rather volatile form of global capitalism, generalfy-
referred to as "Globalization." The relationship between production and consumption under 
globalization— its regime of accumulation— is driven by an enormous increase in the mobility-
of capital and technological progress. This modality has allowed standardization in production 
and trade around the world (the global market principle). The global market principle has led 
to an increased awareness and fear of intense global competition among economic agents, 
forcing a "market discipline." Globalization has made possible production through fledble, 
organizational^ and physically dispersed production units that are linked through technologies 
like the Intranet. This Hoogvelt calls a "flexible accumulation through global webs." Current 
globalized production and consumption is being materialized throxigh a body of interiorized 
rules and social processes— interaction of norms, habits, laws, regulation networks, and so 
on—that "ensure the unity of the process, that approximate consistency of individual behaviors 
with the schema of production" ^pietz, 1986, p. 19). 
Hoogvelt posits that the contours of the current globalized "mode of regulation" 
alreacfy- are influencing capital-state relations, capital-labor relations, and relations between core 
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and periphery classes within as well as between nation-states. This global mode of regulation 
has direa implications for development and for increasing inequality. According to Robert 
GJX (1981), the power of the state has been undermined and the state has become a vehicle of 
transmitting global market discipline to the international economy. Capital-labor relations, too, 
are changing. Jobs related to manufacturing are being relocated from core to periphery states. 
Gsre manufacturing acdvities are being restructured and related jobs are being either shed or 
"externalized." Knowledge has become a fourth faaor alongside the conventional trio of 
capital, labor, and land (raw materials). Knowledge is, in Hoogvelt's words, a very fungible 
fourth faaor, when it is applied with the traditional faaors of production; it releases them for 
other uses. Computer-driven technologies, for example, reduce capital cost. Also, unlike other 
factors, information and knowledge increase with use. Today, the fusion of telecommunication 
and computers, electronic data transmission, video conferencing, and other advances have 
unembedded knowledge workers from the organization. Now firms can externalize 
employment. Many employees are either being replaced by outside contraaors, or becoming 
contractors themselves. Staff departments are being spvin-off as independent contraaors and 
consultancies (Hoogvelt, 1997). 
"Core-periphery relations" is another area where the global mode of regulation is 
asserting consistency with the new globalized schema of productiorL The global division of 
labors is producing a core-periphery relationship that cuts across national and geographic 
boxmdaries, bringing on board within the core segments of the Third World and relegating 
segments and groups in both the traditional core of the system and in the Third World to 
peripheral status. Core-periphery is becoming a social relationship, and no longer a geographic 
one (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 145). Many high-value-added activities that are contributed by 
'disembodied knowledge workers' are not onfy- 'externalized' they are extremefy- mobile. This, 
she thinks, would make the core-periphery relationship more uneven- "Knowledge workers," 
including marketing experts, computer consultants, financial accoimtants, and top managers, 
can relocate globally for the highest price for their services. David Harvqr (1989) sees free 
capital movement giving the international bourgeoisie a decisive advantage over the mass of 
workers who are restricted in their movements and miration by the passport they carry. 
Will Hutton's (1995) 30/30/40 description of British society fits the description of 
global society, where, the core-periphery is a division that cuts across nations. Hutton outlines 
34 
an emei^g British society in which there is a bottom 30 per cent of unemployed and 
economically inactive marginalized and disadvantaged. Another 30 per cent is constituted of 
workers in forms of employment that are structurally insecure. The final 40 per cent have 
tenured jobs with considerable security, Hoogvelt includes individuals with income from 
capital investment in this last category as well. Hutton argues that this is an inefficient system 
of running a state, and Hoogvelt agrees but she thinks it works for global capitalism. There are 
similar three-tier structures growing up in other nations, developed and underdeveloped alike. 
She thinks the difference between underdeveloped and developed countries is solely in the size 
of various segments. The excluded sector in the Third World often approaches 50 per cent, 
with a middle band of between 20 to 30 per cent. 
Hoogvelt suggests that the key to the preservation of the new emerging order (current 
development agenda) is not an economic problem but a law-and-order problem. "It's a 
problem of how to deal with the excluded segment of the society" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 148). 
Shooting of street children in Brazil and Columbia, anti immigration laws and the policing of 
Mediterranean waters around "Fortress Exirope," and the policy of mass incarceration in the 
United States are, to Hoogvelt, all forms of exclusioiL She sees it happening in the politics of 
AIDS research where 90 per cent of research and investment is spent on the development of 
drugs for the treatment of the 8 percent of people who have AIDS in developed countries. 
Funds and research agendas for cheap vaccines to prevent the spread of aids in developing 
coimtries are snuffed out. She quotes a World Bank offidal: "if AIDS falls disproportionatefy-
on the poor in these coimtries then the faa that they wiU die of it will have a positive impact on 
the economic growth of these nations" (The batde for aids, 1995). 
Nfenuel Castells (1993) describes how with the new global information economy a 
significant part of the world population will shift from a structural position of exploitation to a 
structural position of irrelevance. In a new theoretical conceptualization Bennett and Duffield 
(1995) posit that the new aid ^ enda reverses an earlier developmental goal of 
"incorporarion" of peripheral areas into the worid system, and instead now serves as a policy of 
management and containment of political^- insecure territories on the edge of the global 
economy. 
Hoogvelt shows how humanitarian assistance and financial aid through international 
agencies like the World Bank and the IMF are orchestrated in legitimating public responsibility' 
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for debt in developing countries yet at the same time denationalizing the responsibilities 
traditionalfy^ associated with a nation-state. Hoogvelt describes conditionality as a deliberate use 
of aid to create an enabling environment for economic reforms. Leverage through aid, she 
argues, may be achieved through threats of withdrawal of promised loans if certain conditions 
of projects or programs are not met. In the current "regime of regulation" foreign 
development assistance increasingly is being used as lever^e for pushing globalization. We 
therefore hypothesize: 
Hi: Aiddeperuik^ cxintrihiitesposai^ inirtte^ adnglxdecanardesarnor^ lc^  
iruxjrtecountries, dxgreaterdjeaiddepOTdency^ ^^ iterthe jntegratkn't!^  a^ olxdeocmrrik: 
systen. 
We test this hypothesis using three equations represented in table 1. 
(TABLE 1. ABOUT HERE) 
Effectiveness of aid is often measured in terms of output-input calculations, like 
increased energy suppfy- or grain yield against capital and hximan resources (Evans, 1997, p. 46). 
People are missing from this kind of calculation, inclviding those who are advantaged by 
economic growth and those whose rights are violated in the name of growtL Globalization, 
Hoogvelt (1997) thinks, is taking place in a period of "capitalist implosion." She suggests that 
if we measure things like cross border-trade as a percentage of world product, or the number of 
covintries involved in intemarional trade, we will find that a lot fewer countries, particularly in 
Africa, are participating in those kinds of global economic relations. If "capital implosion" is in 
faa happening then enhanced integration with the global economy will exclude or have 
marginal impaa on the development of the countries where popvilarions disproportionately can 
be classified as on the periphery. 
Exclusion of the periphery is being ensured through aid conditionality, demanding 
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, in faa dismantling the public seaor. Kevin 
Watkins of the British Oxfam writes: "Contrary to the World Bank and the IMF claims, the 
position of the poor and the most vulnerable sections of the society have all too often been 
undermined by deregulation of labour market and erosion of social welfare provisions, and, by 
the declining expenditure on health and educarion" (1994, p. 120). In the words of Manuel 
Castells (1993) these populations will shift from structural position of exploitation to a 
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structural position of irrelevance. There is an emerging system of global governance with 
methods and instruments geared to containing and managing symptoms rather than removing 
causes. "The lack of political will to remove such causes attest to a process of disengagement 
from periphery of the world econonty^ (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 181). We hypothesize: 
H2: Extemdckuehpnmtassistcaiceinthamtextofintegratim'isMitheghtdeDorm v^MTuX 
mcJieanysigT a^mtcontnbiidcriswumthhummckvdopmertinwdpieritsta^  
We test these relationships between aid dependency and development with three 
equations presented in table 1. 
Method 
To evaluate our hypotheses we iise the World Bank's World Development Data 1998. 
(Complete definitions for indicators used are provided in the appendix 1). Our hypotheses 
revolve arotind two domains: Aid dependency and the globalization ^tegration with global 
econotcy), and aid dependency and development. 
Sample and Measurement 
After charting the trends for ten theoretical^ relevant variables over a seventeen-year 
(1980-1996) time span and estimating mean change. We estimated two set of equations (table 
1.) using ordinary least square regression. A hybrid cross-section/time-series data set is used. 
For each variable, observations run from 1980 to 1996 and cover each of the 126 countries 
classified as low to middle-low-income countries by the Worid Bank, see appendix 11. 
The prediaors for the indicators of integration with the global economy, the official 
development assistance and official aid (% of GNP), and the use of IMF credit (% of GNP) are 
repeated in the second set of equations for H2 as co-prediaors of the indicators of 
development. It is thus reasonable to assxime some coUineariiy due to correlation among 
prediaors in the second set of equations. To overcome this, in H2, we replaced the observed 
values of the indicators of integration with the global econonty^ with their prediaed residuals 
estimated from the first set of equations for HI (table 1.). 
Full-blown globalization emerged as the former socialist states started to crumble 
through 1980s, making it inappropriate to extend this stucfy- to before 1980. The anafysis stops 
in 1996 because some data are not complete beyond this date. We must add here that the data 
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on hand does not render itself to an accurate assessment of social issues. The United Nations 
Economic and Social Gjundl (UNESCO) recognizes the serious of the problem, in a report on 
Development Indicators (The United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1999). The 
UNESCO said that among international organizations, there remains room for improvement in 
the coordination of data collection. They agreed that there are many instances of inconsistencies 
between data disseminated at the international level The major problems, however, are the 
serious gaps in the international databases. These are, in most instances, a direa consequence of 
the lack of basic statistical data at the country level. There is an enormous mismatch between 
the demand for social indicators and the ability of most countries to supply the required 
information. In our own analysis, the data on public expenditure on health and education was 
consistently missing for most countries. This sigmficantfy- reduced the sample size to only 276 
and 376 cases for equations H2h and H2c respective^" (Table 1). 
Ideally, a research of the kind that we are undertaking requires data on sodal indicators 
cutting across nations. To test the generalizability of our model, in the absence of consistent 
data pertaining to the excluded classes in both developed and developing countries, ovir sample 
comprises of onfy" those countries where the masses can be considered to be living on the 
periphery. This sample is not suitable for research on the world system or dependency theories 
that might require a contrast among core, semi-periphery, and periphery states. 
Measures of aid dependency 
Ratios of aid to GNP, investment, imports, or public spending provide a measure of the 
recipient country's dependency on aid. We used two such ratios for our anafysis. We picked 
official development assistance (% of GNP). Official development assistance (ODA) consists 
of loans and grants made on concessional terms to promote economic development and 
welfare in recipient economies listed as developing. Since ODA is expeaed to promote human 
welfare, we deem it fair to test ODA (% of GNP) against its claim. 
Use of IMF credit (% of GNP) denotes repurchase obligations to the IMF for all uses 
of IMF resources, including trust fund loans and operations imder the structural adjustment 
and enhanced structural adjustment facilities. Structural adjustment facilities are highty 
controversial aid packages overseeing the opening up of national economies to foreign 
investment; cutting bureaucracies and subsidies for food, health, and transport, and the 
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promotion of exports. Structural adjustment programs are accused of being instruments of 
expanding capitalist relations of production in the south (Shaw & Quadir, 1997). Effects of 
such aid on human development compared to its effects on integration of local economies to a 
global capital economy are what prompted us to use this ratio in our analysis. 
Measures of integration with the global economy 
The World Bank's World Development Report (1999) states, "The growing importance 
of trade in the world's economies is one indication of increasing global economic integration. 
Another is the increased size and importance of private capital flows to developing countries 
that have liberalized their financial markets" 327). We use three such indicators to represent 
the degree of integration with the global economy. The indicators highlight key features of the 
ongoing expansion of global markets and are expressed as percent of GDP measured in 
pxirchasing power parity (PPP) to adjust for differences in domestic prices 
We chose gross foreign direa investment (% of GDP, PPP) instead of a standard 
measure of foreign direa investment, that captures onfy- inward investmenL The indicator is 
calculated as a ratio to GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parities. 
The other indicator of increasing global economic integration we used is trade (% of GDP, 
PPP). It is the sum of merchandise exports and imports measured in current U.S. dollars as a 
ratio of GDP, PPP. We also use Gross private capital flows (% of GDP, PPP). Gross private 
capital flows are the sum of investment inflows and outflows. Exceeding outflow (capital 
flight) is known to have compounded the problems of macy low-income countries. 
Indicators of development 
Here, we deviated from the general practice of using income per capita as an indicator 
of development; instead, we prefer a relatively new concept, the Human Development Index 
(MDI). HDI measures the overall achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of 
hiiman development— longevity, education, and a decent standard of Kving. It is measured by 
life expectancy, educational attainment (adult literacy and combined primary, secondary, and 
tertiary enrollment), and adjusted per capita income. This is a more inclusive measure of 
hximan development in a coimoy. 
To assess the degree of exclusion, by design, of peripheralized classes in the sample 
states, we used change in public expenditure on the most basic needs of hximan welfare. We 
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use public expenditure on health (% of GDP) and total public spending on education (% of 
GNP, UNESCO). 
Results 
Shaded values in table 2 provide support for HI. The effeas of ODA were 
consistently non significant across gross private capital flows gross foreign direa investment 
and trade, while use of IMF credit had significantly positive effects across all indicators of 
integration with the global economy. Specific results for sub-hypothesis follow: 
Gross private capital flows (% of GDP, PPP): Hypothesis Hla 
Gross private capital flows show an average decline of 1.96 percent (Figure 1). OLS 
estimation of equations Hla, Hlb, and Hlc assesses the impaa of the indicators of aid on the 
indicators of integration with the global econony. Official development assistance and official 
aid has no significant impact on gross private capital flows, although the slope is negative, 
hinting on the flight of capital. Use of IMF credit, indeed, has a significantly positive impact on 
gross private capital flows. 
Gross foreign direct investment (% of GDP, PPP); Hypothesis Hlb 
In the past seventeen years gross foreign direct investment has made no gains. Foreign 
direa investment barely increased 0.03 percent on average. Once again official development 
assistance and official aid made no significant impact in improving foreign direa investment, 
instead the slope again is negative. Use of IMF credit here, too, has had a significantly positive 
impaa on gross foreign direa investment. 
Trade (% of GDP, PPP): Hypothesis Hlc 
As prediaed, trade has declined on the average a considerable 8.47 percent fi-om 1980 
through 1996. ODA has no significant effea on trade. Yet, use of IMF credit had a 
significant^- positive effea on trade. 
Unshaded values in table 3 provide support for HZ Gross foreign direa investment 
consistent '^ showed no significant effects on the human development indicator or on the 
public expenditure on education and health. Effects of trade were significant^-positive across 
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all indicators of human development while the rest of the findings were mixed. Specific results 
for sub-hypothesis follow 
Human Development Index (HDI): Hypothesis H2a 
HDI values were available for four years; 1980,1992, 1995, and 1996.. The trend on 
HDI in Figure 1 indicates a sturcfy ten percent increase in human development in the past 
seventeen years. However, estimation of equation 1, assessing the impact of aid dependency 
and globalization ^tegration with global economy) produced some interesting results (Table 
2). We had hypothesized no significant effects of aid dependency on HDI; instead we find 
significantlynegative effects on development of official development assistance and official aid. 
The slope for the use of IMF credit on HDI was negative but not significant. Neither Gross 
private capital flows nor gross foreign direa investment had any significant effea on HDI. 
Trade, on the other hand, had a significantly positive impaa on the HDL 
(FIGURE 1. ABOUT HERE) 
Public expenditure on education (% of GDP): Hypothesis H2b 
Data on pubUc expenditures on education and public expenditure on health were 
available only firom 1990 throt^ 1995. Public expenditure on education increased past a 
fi^ction (0.22) of a percent. Combined expenditure on health and education over the years, 
however, showed a downward trend in Figure 1. Estimation of equation 2 showed that neither 
official development assistance and official aid, nor use of IMF credit had significant impact on 
the public expenditure on education 
Indicators of integration with the global econonty- showed mixed results. Gross private 
capital flow and Gross foreign direct investment, neither had any significant impact on the 
public expenditure on education. Trade did, however, indicate a significant positive impaa on 
public expenditure on education. 
(TABLE 2 & TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
Public expenditure on health (% of GDP): Hypothesis H2c 
Public expenditure on health also seems to have recorded a small decline of ,03 percent 
over the years. Estimation of equation fi2c, assessing the impaa of aid dependenqr and 
globalization on public expenditure on health (Table 1), shows that neither official development 
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assistance nor use of IMF credit had any significant impaa on the public expenditure on 
education. 
Once again indicators of integration with the global economy show mixed results. 
Gross private capital flow and trade both show significantly positive impaa on public 
expenditure on health while foreign direa investment made no significant impaa on the public 
expenditure on health. 
As a variation, we excluded former Soviet-Block coimtries from our analysis, becaiise 
these coimtries were more integrated to the Soviet Union through the early 1980s than to the 
rest of the world. We found no significant differences in our analysis. One reason could be the 
lack of reported data for these countries before the end of the Gjld War. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
We said that poverty and increasing inequality need to be reconsidered in the context of 
a new globalized world economy. Relationship between production and consumption under 
globalization— its regime of accumulation— has changed dramaticalfy". Also, the interaction of 
norms, habits, laws, regulation networks, and so on— "the mode of regulation"— are changing 
accordingly. These regulations, we argued, alreacfy- are influencing capital-state reladons, 
capital-labor relations, and relations between core and periphery classes within as well as 
between nation-states. We wanted to test whether the current development agenda and 
financial assistance are just another mode of regulation that is facilitating globalization and as a 
consequence undermining human development in low-income to low-middle income countries. 
We had Itypothesized that aid dependency would promote integration of local 
economies with global economies. In our findings the foreign official development assistance 
and aid did not show any significant impaa on the indicators of globalization. But its negative 
impact, though insignificant, hints on its contribution in capital flight. Even thoiigh the official 
development assistance's (ODA) impaa on globalization might not pass the test of 
generalization for all low-to low-middle-income states, but ODA has undoubtedfy' resulted in 
huge debts over the years repayment of which compounded with interest is crushir^ many 
small economies. The use of IMF credit, like we had expeaed, had a positive significant effea 
on all indicators of integration with the global economy. A component of IMF credit is 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Faciliiy (ESAF) known for its conditionality, adapted 
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especially for low-income countries (our sample). One of the motivations for creating ESAF 
was to refinance retum-flow of past credit fi-om heavily indebted countries (Killick, 1995). The 
policy sdpulaiions attached to ESAF were thus 'espedally vigorous.' Some of the important 
macroeconomic changes it demanded included trade and exchange liberalization. Therefore, 
use of IMF credit, it can be stated safely, has made significant gains in achieving one of its 
objectives, integration of local economies with the global system. 
Interesting '^, the World Bank's World Development Report 1999 states that the aid 
dependency ratios may reveal as much about the interests of the donors as they do about the 
needs of recipients. Helleiner (1990) notes that external trade in goods and services and 
commercially motivated capital flows, and governmental policies toward these activities 
typically are of much greater consequence then aid flows, both to North and to South. Aid 
generally comes heavily tangled in those relations. It is small wonder, then, that aid, with its ties 
to global capital has worsened human deprivation. It was alarming to find ODA (Table 1) to 
have significantly negative consequences for hiunan development. ODA made no positive 
contribution toward public expenditure on education or public expenditure on health. Gross 
foreign direa investment also hints at negative consequences for expenditure on health. Moran 
and Woods (1996) unveil trends leading to globalization of health care policy. In our own 
observations in Pakistan we see "donors" pushing loans worth billions of dollars on a stifling 
economy in the form of failed Social Action Program SAP-I, and now new SAP-II. Health 
care is on the agenda for SAP in Pakistan, where hospitals are being given "autonomy fi-om 
centralized control" (privatizecQ and their subsidies are being cut. The prices of drugs doubled 
overnight in 1997 under obvious pressure fi-om multinational pharmaceutical companies. The 
poor once again are being abandoned and squeezed. 
(FIGURE 2. ABOUT HERE) 
It is notewortly that Use of IMF credit indeed is pushing local economies toward 
globalization, yet at a very high cost of IMF conditionality for the periphery in sample states. 
There is an overwhelming sense of exclusion. The idea that mechanisms of the market-place 
would solve most of the problems low income states faced— unemployment, xmder investment, 
poor public services, inefficient public bureaucracies, unsustainable debt burdens and even lack 
of personal fi-eedom— has proven to be the farce of the century. Increasing inequality rising 
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unemployment and stagnant economies in many structuraUy adjusted states have proved that 
IMF conditionality- has pushed people to their limits. 
One of the rather challenging outcome in our anafysis was the faa that indicators of 
integration with the global economy do show significantly positive afifects on indicators of 
h\mian development trade had a significant positive impaa on all indicators of development; 
HDI, public expenditure on education, and public expenditure on healtL Gross private capital 
flows had a significantly positive effea on public expenditure on education. Similarly gross 
private capital flow significantly effeas public expenditure on health. On a second look it is 
almost intuitive that increased trade and capital flow has a positive impaa on development. It 
will, however, be more appropriate to see if the trade and capital flow in these countries is 
actually increasing. Figure 1 reveals that capital in the form of loans indeed has been flowing in 
huge amounts, yet foreign investment, trade, and capital flow literafy has abandoned these 
countries. Greider writes; "The developing nations (never mind the many more that remain 
stagnant) would point out further that the expanding global system still seems to be rewarding 
the same old folks in the same economic centers" (1997, P. 32). He notes that export remained 
in the hands of a few most advanced coxintries that substantial^- increased their share of total 
exports firom 63 to 72 percent between 1980 and 1991. He points out that most other regions 
actually suffered shrinking exports. Among all the regions, only Asia claimed a larger share, 
growing firom 9 to 15 percent. Kiefy- (1995) points to the faa that integration with the global 
economy does not automatical '^ promote an economy to a rapidfy" expanding capitalist system. 
He writes: 
... the promotion of an efficient capitalism in the developing world should be seen as 
less the outcome of technical policies (such as those of IMF and the Worid Bank) and 
more the outcome of specific sodal processes, which may or may not be reinforced by 
certain favorable -and equalfy- contit^ent - circumstances within the global econon '^ 
(1995, p. 133) 
It is hecnming equa% evident that the "capital implosion" which Hoogvelt has 
suggested in faa is taking place. The Integration with the global economy is, in no way, a 
guarantee against exclusion fi-om the capitalist core. UN's Human Development Report notes: 
"Ironically, those who are left behind are deepfy integrated in worid trade" (1999, p. 35). 
Hoogvelt might not be wrong in suggesting that the key to the preservation of the new 
emerging order is more a law-and-order problem then an economic one. Fajnzylber, Pablo, 
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Daniel Ledennan, and Nonnan Loayza.(1998) write that there is a growing concern aroxmd the 
world about the heightened incidence of criminal and violent behavior. They go on to argue 
that violent crime is emerging as a priority in national policy agendas worldwide. Figure 2 
shows how, by 1994, crime as violent as homicide has risen sharply in almost all 'structurally 
adjusted' areas of the world. Fajnz^dber et al. (1998) fovmd that increases in income inequality 
raise crime rates, deterrence effects are significant, crime tends to be counter<ydical, and 
criminal inertia is significant even after controlling for other potential determinants of homicide 
and robbery rates. The latest trends emerging from East Asia, where crime was declining till 
1994, align it with other deprived regions of the world. The very faa that crime control shows 
up on the World Bank's development agenda provides a verification of Hoogvelt's assertion 
that the new emergii^ order excludes and its preservation depends upon its ability to control 
The UN's Human Development Report (1999) shows how the richest 20% in the 
worid share 86% of the world's GDP, 82% share of exports of goods and services, 68% of 
foreign direct investment and 93.3% of Internet use. We have seen in our own anafysis how 
development aid is the huitii^ poor and how social spending is being held back. Global 
integration might have its benefits but as the Human Development Report (1999), puts it 
"Global integration is still very partial— for one thing the flow of labor is restricted with 
borders closed to the vmskilled'' (1999, p 25). The report goes on to s^: "The collapse of space 
/time and borders may be creating a global village, but not everyone can be a dtizen. The 
global professional elite faces low borders, but billions of others find borders as high as ever" 
(1999, p. 31). Globalization, the report says, is concentrating power and marginalizing the 
poor. There is indeed an overwheknir^ sense of exclusion. 
We also have noticed how emphasis on control (crime for now) is cropping up on the 
agendas of the global institudons. Exclusion and control indeed are happening as prediaed in 
Hoogvelt's modd. The model makes it obvious that increasing incidence of human poverty, 
inequality, imderdevelopment, and misery, after all, is no riddle, but is by design instead. We 
end with a hopeful note from Giddens: 
We should and we can look to achieve greater control over our runaw^ world. We 
shan't be able to do so if we shirk the challenges, or pretend that all can go on as 
before. For globalization is not incidental to our lives today. It is a shift in our very life 
circumstances. It is the way we now live" (1999, Reith Lecture). 
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Appendix I 
Definitions of the Measures Used in the Analysis 
Source; The World Development Report 1998, the World Bank Washington DC 
Measures of aid dependency 
ODA (% of GNP). Official development assistance (ODA) consists of net 
disbursements of loans and grants made on concessional terms by official agencies of the 
members of DAC and certain Arab countries to promote economic development and welfare 
in recipient economies listed as developing by DAC. Loans with a grant element of more than 
25 percent are included in ODA. ODA also includes technical cooperation and assistance. 
Official aid refers to aid flows fi*om official donors to the transition economies of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union and to certain advanced developing coimtries and 
territories as determined by DAC Official aid is provided under terms and conditions similar 
to those for ODA. Aid dependency ratios are computed using values in U.S. Dollars 
converted at official exchange rates. 
Use of IMF credit (% of GNP). Use of IMF credit denotes repurchase obligations to 
the IMF for all uses of IMF resources (excluding those resulting fi-om drawings on the reserve 
tranche). These obligarions, shown for the end of the year specified, comprise purchases 
outstanding under the credit tranches, including enlarged access resoxirces, and all special 
fadliries (the buffer stock, compensatory financing, extended fund, and oil facilities), trust fund 
loans, and operations under the structural adjustment and enhanced structural adjustment 
facilities. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
Measiures of integration with the global economy 
Gross foreign direct investment (% of GDP, PPP). Gross foreign direa investment 
is the sum of the absolute Wues of inflows and outflows of foreign direa investment recorded 
in the balance of p^anents financial accounL It includes equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other lor^-tenn capital, and short-term capital Note that this indicator differs fi-om 
the standard measure of fore^ direa investment, which captures only inward investment. 
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The indicator is calculated as a ratio to GDP converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parities. 
Trade (% of GDP, PPP). Trade as a share of PPP GDP is the sum of merchandise 
exports and imports measured in current U.S. dollars divided by the value of GDP converted 
to international dollars using purchasing power parity conversion faaors. 
Gross private capital flows (% of GDP, PPP). Gross private capital flows are the 
sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and outflows 
recorded in the balance of payments financial account, excluding changes in the assets and 
liabilities of monetary authorities and general government. The indicator is calculated as a ratio 
to GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parities. 
Measures of development 
The Human Development Index (HDI). HDI measures the overall achievements 
in a country in three basic dimensions of human development-longeviiy, knowledge and a 
decent standard of living. It is measured by life expectancy, educational attainment (adult 
literacy and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment) and adjiisted income. 
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP). Public health expenditure consists of 
recurrent and capital spending from government (central and loca^ budgets, external 
borrowings and grants ^eluding donations from international agencies and non-governmental 
organizations), and social (or comptilsoiy) health insurance funds. 
Public spending on education, total (% of GNP, UNESCO). Public expenditure 
on education (tota^ is the percentage of GNP accounted for by public spending on public 
education plus subsidies to private education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. 
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i^pendix II 
Countries for which the data was included in the sample 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1998 
Afghanistan Ghana Pakistan 
Albania Grenada Panama 
Algeria Guatemala Papua New Guinea 
Angola Guinea-Bissau Paragu^ 
Annenia Guinea Peru 
Azerbaijan Guyana Philippines 
Bangladesh Haid Romania 
Belaixjs Honduras Russian Federation 
Belize India Rwanda 
Benin Indonesia Samoa 
Bhutan Iran, Islamic Rep. Sao Tome and Prindpe 
Bolivia Iraq Senegal 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Jamaica Sierra Leone 
Botswana Jordan Solomon Islands 
Bulgaria Kazakhstan Somalia 
Burkina Faso Kenya Sri Lanka 
Burundi Kiribati St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Cambodia Korea, Dem. Rep. Sudan 
Cameroon Kyrgyz Republic Suiiname 
Cape Verde LaoPDR Swaziland 
Central African Republic Latvia Syrian Arab RepubUc 
Chad Lebanon Tajikistan 
China Lesotho TaoTanta 
Colombia Liberia Thailand 
Comoros Lithuania Togo 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Macedonia, FYR Tonga 
Congo, Rep. Madagascar Tunisia 
Costa Rica Malaiwi Turkey 
Cote d'lvoire Maldives Turkmenistan 
Cuba Mali Uganda 
Djibouti Marshalllslands Ukraine 
Dominica Mauritania Uzbekistan 
Dominican Republic Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Vanuatu 
Ecuador Moldova Venezuela 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Mongolia Vietnam 
El Salvador Morocco West Bank and Gaza 
Equatorial Guinea Mozambique Yemen, Rep. 
Ei^ea \fyanmar Yugoslavia, FR 
Estonia Namibia (Serfjia/Moniene 
Ethiopia Nepal Zambia 
F^i Nicaragua Zimbabwe 
Gambia, The N^er 
Georgia N^eria. 
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Table 1. Hypotheses and the equations to test them. 
Hi; Aiddq/ofKiax^eaTbihutesfostBdyin vtt^naoiglocdeoamaBamcrglowardkmmiille-inmBmioWries, Jxgiaua 
tkakldepethrylhegnata'dxi'aes'ittmvaha j^hdeananxystBTt. 
E^uaoons used toast HI 
Hla; Gmspriuaacaptalfiaas - OinscoTt +Offidddealopvmiasastarce(0}dt^ idideal(% 
Ca of GDP, PPP) cfGNP)^ UsecfIMFadit(%ofGNP) 
Hlk Grossfiire^c&Ktinixsermt = Gmsbtra -^Offidddadoprimasastaraardt^iddi^f^ (% of GDP. PPP) (fGNP) + Ux(flMFcro£z (% (fGNP). 
Hlc Trade fa (f GDP, PPP). = Gmscanc +Clffxial(hxlopmaTtassistansandcffidalaid(% (fGNP) + Ux(fmF(7a& (% (fGNP). 
H2: Exxmid(ktdopnKiicassistanxiadKaxmtofintegaaonwah^olxdeaamnfvMtKtmahar^ sg'^ iomtconBnbulxrts 
ta(mnhhiimmdeixiopmicinjhenc^ entsuaes. 
Equaoans usedm tesc H2 
H2a: Human Deuelopnvithdex • Gonscam + Offidal(ieakprmassisurKetaid(fficialaidp(> 
tfGNP)+ UxcflMFcmSt (% (fGNP)-i-Gmsspriuae 
atpaalflaas(%(fGDP, PPP) + Grossfbregiebat 
nzstrrm (% (fGDP. PPP) + Trade (% (fGDP, PPP). 
Hlk Publk Expm/Saman = Qrtstmt +Offldddeixi(^ rTmassistanxand(ffidalaid(% 
Edurathn (%(fGDP) (fGNP)+Ux(fIMF credit (% (fGNP)+ Gmsspriaae 
capitalflaas(%(fGDP, PPP) + Grossfaa^dma 
inatmem (% (fGDP, PPP) + Trade (% (fGDP, PPP). 
H2c Public Expm&toe an Heald} - Csroara +Offidaldeiei^ rnottassisiaTxeiBid(^ alaid(% (%(fGDP) (fGNP) + UxtflMFcreSt (%(fGNP) + Gtosspriaau 
aipitalfloaj5(%(fGDP, PPP) + Grossfine^ eSna 
iae50Tm(% (fGDP, PPP) + Trade (%cfGDP, PPP). 
Table 2. OLS effects of aid on international trade, testing hypothesis H1 
Ind^Kndentumahle 
Sub Hypotheses 
Meandxotge 
N 
Constant 
Officud deudopnent assistwice and official aid of GNP) 
UseoflMF^it {%ofGNP) 
R-squamd 
Adj. R-sqHored 
GDW ptimte capitalflam 
(%ofGDP,PPP) 
"Hla 
-1.96 
1254 
Dependentwriable 
Gmss fmvifft direa investnmt 
(%ofGDP,PPP) 
Hlb 
0.03 
1248 
Trade (% of GDP, PPP) 
7j7c 
-8.47 
1358 
Suouianiani 
Beta 
SLoilxnl 
Error 
% SUrtlmiimi 
Beta 
StdVkimi 
Envr 
% Sunixniimi 
Baa Ermr 
% 
.514 .000 .072 .000 .717 .000 
-.021 .028 .467 -.040 .004 .168 .023 .038 .415 
.070** .069 .015 .061** .010 .036 .084"* .094 .003 
.005 .050 .004 .072 .008 .003 
.003 .003 ^07 
*'Hwtw. digitiiivaiicw cuciiiviciil (tl I /Q ICVCI| 41 J/O JCvCI) dllU Ul lU/0 ICVCI, 
Data source: the World Bank, World Development Repon,1998, the United Nations, Human Development Report, 1998 
Table 3, OLS effects of aid and international trade on the basic indicators of development, testing hypothesis H2 
IndepemhUwrnble Dependmttntiable 
Hmtan Devdoptymn Index Public ExpendiUmon PhUic Expendium cm 
(HDI) Edticatian asa % of Gl DP Health as a % of GDP 
Sub Hypotlxses H2a H2b H2c 
Meandmg  ^ 0.10 0.22 -0.03 
N 344 254 254 
Sta/ktaniimi Suotisnl % SuatLmbmi Siokimi % Sunhnhml SiBkimi % 
Rita Eitdt Brt.1 Envr Beta Error 
Catsumt .012 .000 .144 .000 .122 .000 
Cfficid devdopmtt assistance and official aui(% of GNP) -396*** .001 .000 .051 .010 .361 .005 .007 .934 
Use of IMF (%ofGNP) -.027 .002 .595 .046 .022 .403 .073 .023 .218 
Gmss priiatecapit^  flows (% of GDP, PPPf -.029 .015 .570 .047 .156 .418 .103* .152 .094 
Gross fimgi diwct inuatment (% of GDP, PPP) ^  .068 .Oil .184 -.054 .234 .427 .093 .120 .198 
Trade (% of GDP, PPP)^  .283*** .011 .000 .439**» .129 .000 .342»«* .118 .000 
.000 
l''igure 1. Trends in aid dependency, debt, and integration with die global economy (1980-1997). 
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ETHNIC ATTITUDES IN PAKISTAN 
A paper to be submitted to the International Journal of Intercultural Relations 
Rehan MuUick, Joseph Hraba 
Abstract 
We tested if Punjabi students in Pakistan share, as a group, an ethnic hierarchy and 
exhibit the same types of prejudice found in the West. The sample is 192 students at the Punjab 
OoUege of Business Administration in Lahore in 1996. The students responded to a 
questionnaire in English, with questions nearly identical to those used previousfy" by American 
and Dutch researchers. Principal components analysis revealed respondents' consensus on an 
ethnic hierarchy of out-groups in social distance. Faaor analysis showed that these students 
distinguished among aversive, symbolic, and biological prejudice parallel to American and Dutch 
results. There were two subtypes of symbolic prejudice, one in reference to the Pakistani quota 
system (affirmative action) and another to its uneven regional and ethnic development. Principal 
components analysis (PCA) showed respondents' consensus on types of prejudice as well as 
ethnic hierarchy. Discussion centers on reasons that a shared ethm'c hierarchy and types of 
prejudice foimd in Western countries appear in this Islamic cotintry as well 
Introduction 
Do Punjabi students in Pakistan share a hierarchy of ethnic out-groups.' Do they 
distinguish among the same types of prejudice found in the West? The first question returns to 
the original conception that attitudes are group-held (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918-1920), a 
sociological conception that was then supplanted by a psychological one that attitudes are 
individual states (Allport, 1935). The sociological conception was revived, however, some years 
ago with social representation theory (Foi^ 1981; Jaspars and Fraser 1984; Moscovid 
1961/1976), and has been applied to ethnic attitudes (below). The second question, do Punjabi 
students exhibit the same types of prejudice that survey respondents do in the West, extends 
interest in contemporary forms of prejudice to this Islamic country. 
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Ethnic hierarchy 
Our first question asks if Pmjabi students' ethnic hierarchy is a sodal representation or 
group-held. A sodal representation is "... a cognitive schema that is inter-subjectively shared by 
a sodal group" (D'Andrade 1987:112). If the Punjabis' ethnic hierarchy is a sodal 
representation, then the respondents share a schema that cognitive '^ constructs out-groups in a 
hierarchy by agreeing that out-group D in Figure 1 is to be kept at a greater distance than out-
group C. Out-group C is to be kept at a greater distance than out-group B, and B at a greater 
distance than out-group A. The form of this sodal representation is hierarchical, and its content 
is the group sequence in the hierarchy. What makes it a sodal representation is that it is shared, 
or group-held. 
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
An ethnic hierarchy involves making discriminations among ethnic out-groups in sodal 
distance, although the implied discrimination against out-groups msf be minima]. An ethnic 
hierarchy represents a hierarchical ordering of ethnic groups and suggests that relative position 
of ethnic groups, induding the in-group, is fundamental to people's lai^er system of ethnic 
attitudes. This is what Blumer (1958:4) had in mind when he wrote "... the dominant group is 
not concerned with the subordinate group as such but it is deeply concerned with its position 
vis-a-vis the subordinate group." In this case, we treat Punjabis as a dominant group. 
A group-held ethnic hierarci^ is an example of the sodological conception of attitudes 
revived by sodal representation theoiy. This began with Moscovid's (1961/1976) study of the 
French sodal representation of psychoanalytic theory, and French sodal sdentists subsequently 
studied sodal representations of health and illness (Herzlich 1973), childhood (Chcmbart de 
Lairwe 1971/1978), and the bocfy- (foddet 1984). Outside France, sodal representation was 
employed in the stucfy- of sodal movements ^iGiacomo 1980), interpretations of a race riot 
(Litton and Potter 1985), sodal identities (Duveen and Lloyd 1986), as well as ethnic attitudes 
(Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee 1982; Jaspars and Wamaen 1982). Ethnic hierarchies can be 
sodal representations as welL Students in The Netherlands, the fonner Soviet Union and the 
United States shared sodal-distance hierarchies about ethnic groups in their own countries 
(I^endoom, Drogendijk, Tumanov and Hraba, 1998; Hagendoom and Hraba 1989; Hraba, 
Piagendoom and t^endoom 1989; Piraba and Mok 1990). Our first l^pothesis is that we will 
find a shared ethnic hierarchy amor^ Punjabi students in Pakistan as welL 
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Types of prejudice 
Do Punjabi students also exhibit the types of prejudice found in the West? American 
and European survey respondents distinguish among biological, symbolic, and aversive prejvidice 
(e.g., Hraba, Brinkman and Gray-Ray 1996; Kleinpenning and Hagendoom 1993). Biological 
prejudice, or the belief in innate differences between ethnic groups, is rooted in Social 
Darwinism, past racial domination at home, and/or colonial rule abroad (Kovel 1970). The 
ruling group was thought to be naturally superior to the ruled (McConah^ 1986; We%el and 
Howes 1985). However, there has been the fading of biological prejudice and the simultaneous 
rise in both Europe and the United States of symbolic or cultural prejudice in recent decades 
(Kluegel and Bobo 1993; Pettigrew 1985,1979; Smith and Dempsey 1983; Crosby, Bromley, and 
Saxe 1980; Taylor, Sheatslq^, and Greeley 1978). The belief that minority out-groups are 
different in values, if not biologically, and they are too demanding constitutes the core of 
symbolic prejudice (Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980; Sears and 
Kinder 1971; McConahay and Hough 1976; Sears and Ciiin 1985; Schuman, et al. 1985). 
Whereas symbolic prejudice represents opposition to symbols of change in the racial status quo, 
aversive prejudice reflects the feelings of uneasiness, discomfort, fear, and the resulting desire to 
avoid out-groups (H^endoom and Kleinpenning 1991; Dovidio and Gaertner 1986; Pettigrew 
1985; Kovel 1970). The latter is a third type of prejudice that African as well as European 
Americans, for example, exhibit (e.g., Hraba, Brinkman, and Grzy-Kay 1996). This is a widely 
shared reading of the history of prejudice in the United States and similar changes were noted in 
Europe, with the newer types of prejudice called cultural and aversive racism (Baker 1981). 
Sociologists have long utilized a social causation l^othesis, whereby social histoiy is 
thought to shape current ethnic attitudes (e.g., Bobo and Hutching*; 1996). The contemporary 
types of prejudice in the West seem to reflect particular national histories. There was 
colonialism abroad and/or racial domination at home, as noted above, supported ideologically 
by Social Darwinism, the historical precedent to biological prejudice. This was followed by the 
demise of colonialism and the rise of minority claims and home states' reaction to them, the 
bacl^ound of majority groups' symbolic or cultural prejudice. Aversive prejudice also flows 
from this history. 
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Types of prejudice in Pakistan 
Pakistan is a nation, however, with a different history than the West. It was once part of 
a British colony, not a European or American colonizer, and thus Pakistanis have had seemingly 
litde need for biological prejudice regarding people of color. In addition, Pakistan's cultural 
heritage is Islamic According to Kaviraj (1997), the British Raj reinforced the difference 
between Muslims and Hindus that ultimately legitimized the subcontiaent's partition and 
Pakistani independence. The nation was founded on the principles of Islamic Brotherhood 
(fOTvmh), equality, justice, freedom from want, and the devotion to social welfare that had 
charaaerized the earlier Muslim community. The presumption is that all Pakistanis are equal in 
the eyes of the state as they are before Allah, a sentiment stated in the preamble of the national 
constitution. This history is seemingfy' far removed from Sodal Darwinism and the embedded 
concepts of a hierarclty- of the fit and unfit, the innately superior and inferior, which 
characterizes the history of the West. H^endoom and Henke (1991) concluded that Muslim 
society- appears to findu Indians egalitarian and relatively fi*ee of prejudice, and thus appeals to 
the low castes, explaining their conversion to Islam. Does this egalitarianism mean that Muslim 
Pakistanis are fi-ee of the forms of prejudice toward each other that prevail in the West, namefy-
aversive, symbolic, as well as biological prejudice.' Perhaps so, but ia the West, too, there is an 
ideology free of prejudice, called by Nfyrdal (1944) the American creed. It is derived fi-om 
historic liberalism and an ejcpanding conception of citizenship in the modem western nation-
state (Hraba 1992; Hraba and Hoiberg 1983). The difference between Pakistan and the West 
may be only the sanctions behind egalitarianism, with one being secular ^beralism) and the 
other sacred (Islam) as well 
Furthennore, the actual impact of Islam on ethnic attimdes in Pakistan is not yet 
empirical^ deteraiined. At one level, the sacred and state-supported ideology of a universal 
Muslim brotherhood seems to de-emphasize ethnic differences within Pakistan. Jacobson 
(199^ found among Pakistani youth in Great Britain a decided preference for a Muslim over a 
Pakistani identity, suggesting perhaps a global appeal to the religious rather than the national or 
sub-national identity. Below the sacred and state-endorsed ideology of a universal Muslim 
brotherhood is, however, the ethnic reality of PakistaiL 
Pakistan is a multi-ethnic state like the United States and many European nations. 
Concentrated in different regions and many with their own regional governments, each ethnic 
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group speaks its own langu^e and protects its ethnic lineage with a vengeance. As Jalal (1992:3) 
noted: "The Muslims of the Sindh, North Western Frontier Province (N.WP.P.), and 
Baluchistan had one thing in common: a fierce attachment to their particularistic traditions and 
deep antipathy to the central control." Punjabis, the largest part of Pakistani population (55%), 
are concentrated in the North Eastern Province of Punjab, a region of fertile agricultural lands. 
Sindhis (20%) are concentrated in the south, Pathans (10%) in the N.WJFJP., and the Baloch 
(5%) in the southwest. Muhajirs, the Urdu-speaking immigrants who migrated from India at and 
around the time of Partition, setded in urban Sindh and comprise approximately 10% of 
Pakistan's population. Thus, Pakistan is not only a multi-ethnic state but also one where ethnic 
boundaries are coterminous with language and region, and many of its ethnic groups have 
separate regional governments within the national government. 
Other ethnic groups considered Punjabis as a colonizer during the British Raj. At 
independence in 1947, Pimjabi landowners acquired a considerable influence over Pakistani 
politics,and thus a dominant role in the distribution of the nation's resources. Bengalis 
continued to view Punjabis as internal colonizers, culminating in a dvil war in 1971 and the 
creation of BangladesL Does this history suggest that at least Punjabis among Pakistani ethnic 
groups share with westerners an historical prerequisite to biological prejudice.' 
In the past couple of decades, other ethnic groups, Pathans, Balochis, Muhajirs, and 
Sindhis have been making claims for what they perceive to be their just share of national 
resources. This history has been depicted in stages marked by which groups have been most 
successful in making these claims. Nyrop (1983:231) wrote "... as a result of significant roles 
played by its dominant personalities, it is reasonable to describe the periods between 1947 and 
1958 as the Punjabi phase; the period between 1958 and 1971 as the Pakhtun (Pathan) phase; the 
period between 1971 and 1977 as the Sindhi phase; and the period since as the Muhajir 
immigrant) phase." Nyrop admitted that these divisions are arbitrary, but argued that they can 
assist in atten^ting to understand Pakistan's political history. This recent history of minority-
claims on the home state is parallel to that in the West and msy provide the background for 
Punjabi symbolic prejudice. 
To be sure, ethnic competition has resrolted in communal violence in the short history of 
the country. Sub-nationalist ethnic currents led to a dvil war in 1971 and succession of the 
eastern wit^ of the couintry into the independent state of Bangladesh, as already noted- During 
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the dvil war in 1971, once the perception of injxistice was established in the minds of the 
Bengalis, the ideology of Islamic brotherhood receded and the subterranean reality of ethnic 
differences became manifest. "Later the Pakistani state was severely tested by Baluchistan 
rebellion in the mid-1970s and by Sindh uprising in the mid-1980s'' (Samad 1995:8). More 
recently, Muhajirs in the urban Sindh have pressed claims for a separate governmental unit 
alreacfy-the case for other groups if their rights are not respeaed (Rahman 1997). The dispute 
over Kalabagh dam projea on the border of the N. W. F. P. and the Punjab has a deddedly 
ethnic dimension, involving not only Pathans and Punjabis but others as well. Furthermore, 
while certain parts of Pakistan have experienced unprecedented growth and development, many 
other regions and their populations have remained underdeveloped and impoverished. Almost 
every Pakistani government has recognized this dilemma and tried to introduce what maity' 
consider cosmetic and yet controversial measures like job and educational quotas, as well as 
schemes for the geographical, and thus ethnic, distribution of resources. 
This suggests we naight find similar types of prejtxdice in Pakistan as in western multi­
ethnic states, at least symbolic prejudice. Furthermore, ethnic groups in Pakistan are distributed 
by region, leading to competition over regional distributed resources, imp^^ that regional 
competition might be a component of Pakistani symbolic prejudice. Perhaps, we will also find 
biological prejudice on the part of Pxmjabis rooted in their history of internal colonialism. Our 
Itypotheses are that we will find that Punjabi students distinguish among the types of prejudice 
found in the West as well as share an ethnic hierarchy of sodal distance toward out-groups. 
Methods 
Sample and questionnaire 
We selected in August 1996 a sample of students at the Punjab College of Business 
Administration in Lahore, Pakistan. Students in half of the mandatory classes at the college were 
randomfy- selected and asked to fill out English-language questionnaires in class. The students 
were informed that the researchers wanted to know what they honestfy- felt about various ethnic 
groups in Pakistan and that their opinions would go a loc^ way toward understandii^ ethnic 
relations in the country. We did not ask for their names so that their answers were anonymous 
and their partidparion was completely voluntary. The questionnaire consisted of items in seven 
sections: sodal distance, perceived out-group threat, prejxidice, stereotypes, stratification beliefs. 
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ethnic ranking, and personal charaaeristics, and was nearly identical to that employed by Hraba, 
Brinkman, and Gr^-Ray (1996) in the United States. The only changes are using labels for 
Pakistani ethnic groups, the appropriate word for neighborhood, rele\*ant labels for income and 
political party affiliation, and new items for regional resource distribution in Pakistan. Using 
virtually identical questions facilitates direct and indirect cross-national comparisons, with the 
later critical to this paper. The ages of the respondents ranged from 18 to 49 years, with a mean 
of around 22 years. Most of the respondents are men (85%). 
Although these students qualify as representatives of the dominant group, certainty' in 
Punjab if not the whole of Pakistan, they are a convenience sample. Are their ethnic attitudes 
typical of Punjabis in general? This is ultimately an empirical quesrion, of course, but we can 
speculate. On the one hand, these students may be particularly western in their orientation, given 
their interest in business administration and origins in the upper middle class. Many of these 
students come from families in private business or landowners in rural Punjab. We know that 
income and education in the West are negatively associated with the level of prejudice 
respondents express on questionnaires, but neither is associated with sharing an ethnic hierarchy 
or discerning types of prejudice, and these are our research issues. These types and the ethnic 
hierarchy may vary by class backgroimd and business orientation in Pakistan, but there is no 
compelling reason to suspect that th^ do. Moreover, if the students' types of prejudice reflea 
ethnic realities in Pakistan, and we argue later that they do, then we can at least claim that their 
attitudes are grounded in a social reality and Kkety shared by other Pxmjabis. 
Measures 
Ethnic Hierarchy. Respondents responded to five social-distance statements about 
four target out-groups (Balochis, Muhajirs, Pathans, and Sindhis) in five domains of contaa. 
The domains are: (1) To have many... as classmates or coworkers would be, (2) To have maity-
... setded inyour mohalla (neighborhooc^ or town would be, (3) To have many... as fnends 
would be, (3) To have many... as fiiends would be, (4) To have... as your business partner 
would be, (5) To marry a... would be. The response categories ranged from very objectionable 
(1) to very acceptable (9). A general measure of the amoimt of social distance towards an ethnic 
group across the five domains was computed using the arithmetic mean of the sum scores. 
Equal sodal distance scores toward the target groups averaged across domains would indicate a 
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non-hierarchical conception of Pakistani multi-ethnic society. Unequal scores indicate a 
hierarchical conception, or keeping out-groups at different degrees of social distance. Our 
interest is the respondents' consensus about the group sequence in social distance. To test for 
consensus on social distance toward tai^ets, principal component analysis was perforaied on 
these scores for all target groups. 
Prejudice. Kleinpenning and Hagendoom (1993) measured prejudice with 16 items 
that represented attitudes about segregation, affirmative action, out-group intelligence and 
culture, and sodai distance. Applying faaor anafysis to these items, Kleinpenning and 
Hagendoom (1993) created four distinct prejudice scales: biological, symbolic, aversive, and 
ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism was excluded from the present stucfy- because Hraba, Brinkman 
and Gr^-Ray (1996) in the United States excluded it. Excluding items on ethnocentrism and 
parallel to both of the previous studies, we applied faaor analysis to the 20 social distance and 
then 9 other prejudice items (the 29 items are shown in Table 2). Items pertaining to biological 
prejudice were computed by aggregating and averaging the scores across all non-Punjabi targets. 
Items indicative of symbolic prejudice have no specific target. The items that faaored together 
were used as our prejudice scales. We then tested for the reliability of the resulting prejudice 
scales using Cronbach's (1951) internal consistency measure of reliability- (see results). To test 
for consensus among respondents in discerning the same type of prejudice we used principal 
components analysis. 
Religious Observance. To check if religious observance affects respondents, 
distir^;uishing among types of prejudice and their ethnic hierarchy, we included this variable. We 
asked respondents how often they offered prayers, from only on Eids (a Muslim hoiydsy 
celebrating the end of Ramadan) (1) to praying five times per day (5), coded in the direction of 
the frequency of observance. We subsequently divided respondents at the median into high and 
low on religious observance. 
Ethnicity. Respondent's ethnidty was a self-reported item on the questionnaire. Out 
of 192 respondents 153 identified themselves as Punjabis, 13 as Pathans, five as Muhajirs, four 
as Balochis, and one as a Sindhi. The rest either omitted or responded as others. (Onty- the 153 
Punjabi respondents are used in this ana^sis.) 
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Analysis plan 
We first test for respondents' ethnic hierarchy with prindpal component analysis. When 
a single component explains most of the variance in social-distance responses to the tai^et 
groups we can assume respondents share the perceived hierarchy of target groups. Respondents 
agree on which target groups are to be kept at a greater distance than others. Our second step is 
test respondents exhibiting types of prejudice with faaor analysis. Faaor results can show if 
Punjabi respondents disoiminaie among types of prejudice as fovind in the West. 
Results 
Ethnic hierarchy 
Respondents discriminate among ethnic out-groups in terms of social distance. The 
average social distance toward all target groups across all domains was 5.26, with a score of 9 
beii^ most acceptable. Most social distance is toward Muhajirs (4.9), followed by Sindhis (5.2), 
Baluchis (5.3), and Pathans (5.7), in descending order (see Table 1). A one-w^ ANOVA 
revealed that the means are significantfy-different (F = 5.63, p = 0.00) at alpha .05. The 
respondents have a hierarchical conception of out-groups in social distance terms. Between 
groups however,, the paired comparison test, revealed no significant difference between social 
distance toward Sindhis and Balochis. 
Principal component analysis was used to test for respondents' sharing this group 
sequence, and it was applied to the social distance items toward all tai^et groups across all 
domains. These scores loaded onto a single component, the group sequence shown in Table 1, 
explainii^ 67% of the total variance. Sixty-two percent of the respondents express greater social 
distance towards Muhajirs than Pathans at the opposite end of the hierarcly, and 63% indicate 
less social distance toward Baluchis and Sindhis compared to Muhajirs. The mean social 
distance toward Baluchis and Sindhis is not veiy different, however. We can assume virtual 
consensus about this group sequence on the ethnic hierarchy of these Punjabi smdents. 
Rel^ous observance did not affeCT respondents' ethnic hierarchy. P^h and low observant 
respondents share the same group sequence on the hierarcly of out-groups. The onfy- different 
between them is high observance respondents expressed significant^- less social distance toward 
Muhajirs (X= 5.12 v. 4.49). The factor loading on item: "To have Pathans as your business 
partner would be" was comparative '^ low (.43). Pathans are not dominant players in the 
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business seaor in Pakistan. Punjabi Student's, probably, did not see the possibility of working 
with them in a business setting, as a concrete one. 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
Types of prejudice 
Once items assessing aversive prejudice loaded onto a single faaor (Table 2), we 
excluded those items from the rest of the items measuring prejudice, following Kleinpenning 
and Hagendoom (1993). Five of the remaining 14 prejudice items ("because of no roots 
minorities should be excluded from the country," "differences between ethnic groups are 
genetically determined," "mixed mairiages would enrich Pakistani society," "member of my 
ethnic group behaves better," and "government revenues should be spent on areas from which 
they are collected") did not correlate with any other prejudice items higher then .26. Consistent 
with Kleinpenning and Hagendoom's (1993) criterion for item exclusion, we excluded these 
items from further analysis on the basis of their low correlation. 
For the remaining 9 items faaor analysis was applied (PGA. extraction, Varimax 
rotation). The analysis shows a three-faaor structure (second run in Table 2). Four items 
pertaining to physical and biological traits: "intelligence", "looks", "warrior type," and "physical • 
build"- loaded clearly on a single faaor that we label biological prejudice (Table 2). Three items 
associated with regional resource allocation and two associated with job quotas load separately 
on the second and third faaors. The second and the third faaors together are symbolic 
prejudice. In addition, we separated respondents into high and low at the median of the 
religious observance variable, and performed separate faaor anafyses identical to those above. 
Respondents high and low on religious observance distinguished the same types of prejudice as 
above, except that respondents low on observance-conneaed intelligence with symbolic and not 
biological prejudice (not shown). 
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
Aversive prejudice includes items measuring social distance toward all out-group tai^ets 
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.92). Beliefs in innate group differences represent biological prejudice. 
Biological prejudice is respondents' perception of intelligence, looks, toughness (warrior-type 
charaaeristics), and physical build of specific out-groups. When combining tai^et groups the 
overall alpha for biological prejudice is onfy modest (.59). The respondents do not consider 
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intelligence and looks to be correlated across multiple targets. Target groups that are high on 
intelligence are not necessarily high on looks, and those high on looks are not necessarify' high 
on intelligence. Alphas improve significantly (up to .76) when biological prejudice items are 
assessed for one specific tai^et group at a dme. Symbolic prejudice is composed of two sub-
scales, one concerning regional distribution of resources and the other about job quotas (Table 
2). The overall score for symbolic prejudice is simply the sum of the item scores within each 
sub-scale. 
Respondents' consensus on types of prejudice was assessed using principal components 
analysis. The first three components explained 59 percent of the total variance in the responses 
to the nine prejudice items. The first component (biological prejudice) explained 28.3 percent of 
variance in responses to the nine prejudice items, with an eigenvalue of 2.54. The second 
component (symbolic prejiidice, regional resources) explained 16.5 percent, with an eigenvalue 
of 1.49, and the third component (symbolic prejudice, quotas) explained 13.8 percent of 
variance, with an eigenvalue of 1.24. We can assume significant consensus in how these Punjabi 
students distinguish among types of prejudice. 
Discussion 
These results were striking^- similar to those of Hraba, Brinkman, and Gray-Ray (1996) 
and Kleinpenning and H^endoom (1993) with respect to types of prejudice. The Punjabi 
students distinguished among aversive, symbolic, and biological prejudices, parallel to survey 
respondents in the West. Furthermore, distinguishing among these types of prejudice hardly 
varied by religious observance of the Punjabi respondents. The one difference was that the 
Pimjabi respondents differentiated symbolic prejudice into two subtypes. This was expeaed, 
however, since the ethnic distribution of resovirces in Pakistan is by territory as well as job and 
educational quotas. In addition, biological prejudice was confined to physical and mental 
charaaeristics in Pakistan. Biological prejudice in the Netherlands and the United States 
contained items on excluding new immigrant groups firom the coimtry and neighborhood, 
immigration issues that are not as salient in Pakistan, as well as groups behaving badly ^iraba, 
Brinkman, and Gray-R^ 1996; Kleinpenning and Hagendoom 1993). 
One tcanf conclude that a Western history of colonialism, racial domination at home. 
Social Darwinism, and the rise of minority claims are not necessary for respondents 
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distinguishing between biological, symbolic, and aversive prejudice. Punjabi students who are 
Muslims and have a dififerent history discern the same types of prejudice found in the West. On 
the other hand, "to most members of the minorities... they equate 'Pakistan' with Punjabis and 
Muhajirs, who are perceived as having occupied and annexed their territories forcibly as an 
imperial power" (Harrison 1991: 303). Harrison goes on to say "there is an unmistakable note 
of ethnic arrogance in the Punjabi attitude- a desire to show the 'primitive' Baluch tribesmen 
who is the master.... (1991:308)." In 1971 after a bloody dvil war when the eastern wing of the 
country parted ways to emerge as an independent state of Bangladesh, Bengali leaders also 
equated the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani military as oppressive colonizers. Even though these 
allegations are debatable, most other ethnic groups in Pakistan in fact perceive Punjabis as 
colonizers. By implication, Punjabis may have an historical prerequisite for biological prejudice. 
It is also possible, however, that other ethnic groups in Pakistan distinguish biological from the 
other types of prejudice, and thus a history of being dominant and a colonizer, Western or 
otherwise, is not necessary for biological prejudice. 
As to symbolic prejudice, the Punjabi students distinguished two subtypes of symbolic 
prejudice, one based on job and educational quotas and the other on regional distribution. This 
surely reflects the social reality in Pakistan, where ethnic claims and state-sponsored quotas 
concern the distribution of resources by region as well as opportunity within regions. Future 
research m^t find that other ethnic groups in Pakistan distinguish these subtypes of symbolic 
prejudice as weL In regard to aversive prejudice, social distance has been observed in many 
different countries with various histories. We found it in Pakistan as welL It is a robust finding 
and seemingly not dependent on variations in national history, although it is certainty- consistent 
with the geographic distribution of ethnic groups in Pakistan- These results suggest that findings; 
about the types of prejudice in the West can be extended b^ond the West. 
Furthermore, an ethruc hierarchy was group-held by the Punjabi students. They ^ eed 
about what out-groups are to be kept at a greater distance than the others. They expressed the 
greatest distance toward Muhajirs and the least toward Pathans, and social distance toward 
Sindhis and Balochis is virtualtythe same. Muhajirs, generaify-well-educated, challenge the top 
positions of Punjabis in the national bureaucracy and compete with them for bureaucratic 
control of resoxirces. This is a likety reason that the students placed the Muhajirs at the bottom 
of their bxireaucracy. Not onty do Pathans not threaten the Punjabi control of the state 
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bureaucratically, they along with Punjabis constitute the bulk of the Pakistani amy, a significant 
power behind the scene. Punjabi students also see Pathans as having desirable physical and 
social attributes. Sindhis and Balochis, being more concentrated in their respective home regions 
and relative '^ distant from Punjabis, were hardly distinguishable in social distance. 
Religious observance had no bearing on the respondents' ethnic hierarchy and types of 
prejudice. The implication is that observance of Islam does not affea students' hierarchical 
conception of out-groups in social distance, nor does it affea their exhibiting the same types of 
prejudice foimd in the West. However, more observant students expressed less social distance 
toward Muhajirs, possibly reflecting a religioxis tie with this out-group, while the less observant 
see Muhajirs more in competitive terms. 
Tbis stucfy- is an exploration at best. It must be followed by studies with national samples 
from Pakistan as well as other countries that are relevant to the issues of historical sources of 
current forms of prejudice. More representative samples also should contain a coimtr/s ethnic 
diversity. This would provide for inter-group as well as cross-national comparisons. With such a 
comparative design, we mzy learn how variations in national history and/or present ethnic 
realities affea current forms of prejudice across as well as within coTintries. 
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Figure 1. The group-held ethnic hierarchy and prejudice types in Pakistan, 
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Table 1. Punjabi students' social distance toward Pakistani out-groups (N-ISS) 
Outgroups Mean Social Range Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Distance* 
Pathans 5.7' 7.4 1.4 9.0 1.76 
Balochis 5.3  ^ 8.0 1.0 9.0 1.67 
Sindhis 5.2  ^ 7.6 1.4 9.0 1.81 
Muhajirs 4.9' 8.0 1.0 9.0 1.94 
a, b, and c are significantly different, b are not significantly different at p < .05. 
Table 2. Factor loadings of prejudice items for Punjabi students (N= 153) 
Aversive Biological Symbolic Prejudice 
Pre'iudice Prejudice 
Variable 
Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 2 (Resources) 
Factor 3 
(Quotas) 
Variaus Variance Variwwe Variance 
Explakud Explained Explabwd Explaiiwd 
39.72% 28.26% 16.30% 1X78% 
Siidhis 
To have many Sindhis as classmates or co-woriters would be ,66 -
To have many Sindhis settle in your mohallah (neighborhood) would be .62 -
I'o have many Sindhis as friends would be .79 -
To have Sindliis as your business partners would be .72 -
To many a Sindhi would be 
Padms 
To have many Pathans as classmates or co-worlurs would be 
.65 
-
.76 
To have many Pathans settle in your mohallah (neighborhood) would be .70 -
I'o have many Pathans as friends would be .80 -
To have Pathans as your business pattners would be .43 -
To many a Pathan would be .76 . 
Balodni 
To have many Balochis as classmates or co-woHters would be .75 
To have many Balochis settle in vour mohallah (neighborhood) would be .73 . 
To have many Balochis as friends would be .64 . 
To have Balochis as your business partners would be .59 . 
To many a Balochi would be .76 -
MiJujia 
To have many Muhajirs as classmates or co-wotkers would be .73 . 
To have many Muhajirs settle in your mohallah (neighborhood) would be .77 -
To have many Muliajirs as friends would be .76 
To have Muhajirs as your business panners would be .78 -
To many a Miihajir would be .65 
Intelligence'* . .73 .12 -.02 
lx)oks* . 
.80 .19 -04 
Warrior Traits'' .81 -.19 -.11 
Physical Build" - .80 -.05 -.01 
Development resources are unjustly allocated to different regions in Pakistan . .03 .64 -.08 
Economic resources in Pakistan should be allocated according to the population size of a region .17 .66 .00 
Economic resources in Pakistait should be allocated according to the level of development of a region . -.07 .74 .04 
Quota system in Pakistan to help individuals from tuiderptivileged regions to get aliead is fair . 
-.18 .09 77 
Individuals from underdeveloped rcRions of Pakistan should get preferential treaunents in Retting jobs . .11 -.14 79 
across target groups 
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CONCLUSION 
The material and social conditions of globalization no longer support the long-standing 
pyramidal view of the world order as a geographic core-periphery hierarchy. Past development 
theories, though radically opposed in pointing out the rights and wrongs of the pyramid, shared 
the premises of "universalistic and inclusive credo" that aU human beings on the planet had a 
right to partake in the ficuits of technological and economic advancement" (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 
239). The nation-state was the central arbiter and agent of development and the inherent drive 
of capitalist expansion was to lead the way to worldwide social progress (Hoogvelt, 1997) or 
destruction. Globalization has changed it all. 
This new world economic order is the outcome of neo-liberal economic policies that 
regard the market as the central organizing principle of human societies and economic growth as 
its primary goaL It idealizes firee trade, efficiency, and perfect competition. It can be seen as an 
extension of the mercantile and colonial period paced up tremendously with a revolution in 
communication and information technologies. Economic policies of deregulation, privatization, 
government 'downsizing' and market liberalization are the tools to enforce and regulate this 
system. The nation-state, which was considered the central arbiter and agent of development, 
now has become a "rent seeking" police for globalization. Developmentalism is lost in the 
current, dog-eat-dog, competition in which states are pitted against states, regions against 
regions, and individuals against individuals. "In the present stage of high-tech information-
driven capitalism, there is, for the moment, neither theory, world view, nor moral injunction, let 
alone a program of action, to include them (excluded masses) in universal progress" (Hoogvelt, 
1995, p. 240). 
The Bretton Woods instimtions, whatever they contributed to the development in their 
earlier years, under globalization have... 
...gravitated to a different purpose: advancing the revolution, fostering conditions 
necessary for the "one world" market envisioned by finance capital In various collateral 
ways, both institutions now serve as paternalistic agents of global capital—enforcing 
debt collection supervising the finandal accounts of poor nations, promoting wage 
suppression and other policy nostrums, preparing the poorer countries for eventual 
acceptance by the global trading system (Greider, 1997, p. 281). 
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The empirical evidence we presented in our first paper supports this point of view. We 
have seen that aid dependency contributes positively to the indicators of integration with the 
global economy and at the same time some of the dependency indicators showed significandy 
negative consequences for human development. Greider (1997) likens the zeal to impose this 
"mode of regulation" to a medieval church proselytizing for a fundamentalist theology. He 
quotes Susan George and Fabrizio SabeUi "The missionary is replaced by the neoclassical 
economist, the development expert mediates between the developed and undeveloped worlds as 
the priest mediates between the divine and secular ones, helping the underdeveloped to tread the 
long road to salvation. The way is hard and steep; it's not for the faint hearted." (1994, p. 6). 
"The religion has clearly failed to save the sinners from their poverty," writes Greider 
(1997, p. 282). The polices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (EVIF) 
under SAPs (structural adjustment programs) so far have translated into cutbacks on social 
spending, inseomty, social exclusion, poverty, rising crime, and community disintegration. We 
have seen in the first paper how the expenditure on sodal spending, as basic as health and 
education, has been slashed amidst increasing poverty and rising population. 
The United Nations' Human Development Report (1999) provides alarming figures on 
the concentration of wealth and increasing inequality. We saw in paper one that Hoogvelt's 
assertions on the implosion of capital carry a lot of weight. Even though firmnn'al transactions 
worth a trillion dollars take place each day across the globe, the capital remains in increasingly 
fewer hands. We saw evidence for capital flight from poorer states, yet no significant gains were 
recorded in foreign direct investment there. In reality, foreign direct investment is decreasing in 
most developing countries. Hirst and Thompson (1996) argue on similar lines that there is no 
massive shift of capital, investment, or employment from advanced to developing countries, 
something globalization is suggested to have done. The G3 (Europe, Japan, North America) still 
dominate the world economy with only 14% of the global population and 75% of all direct 
investment flows including ones from poorer states. Hirst and Thompson (1996) conclude that 
globalization is a "myth." From a Third Worid perspective economic gains of globalization are 
indeed a myth, but its costs, economic and social, are very reaL 
Globalization is not merely an economic phenomenon. .it's a complex set of 
processes, not a single one. And these operate in a contradictory or oppositional ^hion" 
(Giddens, 1999). Giddens thinks that to look at globalization solely in economic terms is a 
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mistake. To him "globalization is political technological and cultural, as well as economic" 
(1999). Hoogvelt does not see it as purely economic either. "Globalization is the intensification 
of human interaction at aU levels—financial, social, and cultural" (1997, p. 10). She thinks that 
as a result of globalization a condition of "exclusion and anarchy" exists in parts of the world 
where states emerging after independence were not strong enough viably to lonite the dvil 
sodety out of the mosaic of ethnic Segments bequeathed by colonial administrations. In the 
second paper we found that ethnically dominant Pvinjabi students in Pakistan expressed 
biological prejudices against outgroups much the way their colonial heritage dictated it. Pakistan 
does represent a firagile social and political order similar to the one found in sub-Saharan Afidcan 
states. Globalization, structural adjustment, and failxire to progress can lead the country iato 
dvil strife, anarchy, and instability. Giddens (1999) also believes that as the hold of the older 
nation-state weakens, local nationalism and cultural identities will spring up as a response to 
globalizing tendendes in different parts of the world. 
The results in the second artide were strikingly similar to those of Hraba, Brinkman, and 
Gray-Ray (1996) and Kleinpenning and Hagendoom (1993) with respect to types of prejudice. 
The Punjabi students distinguished among aversive, symbolic, and biological prejudices, parallel 
to survey respondents in the West. We do find in Pakistan the fundamental premise of 
multiculturalism manifest in its oppositional structure of "new radsm." Furthermore, 
distinguishing among these types of prejudice hardly varied by religious observance of the 
Punjabi respondents. The universalistic ideal of Islam that was the basis of the formation of 
Pakistan seems vulnerable to biologically-derived notions of racial superiority. Also, these 
respondents differentiated symbolic prejudice into two subtypes. This was expected, however, 
since the ethnic distribution of resources in Pakistan is by territory as well as j>b and educational 
quotas. This surdy reflects the sodal reality in Pakistan, where ethnic claims and state-
sponsored quotas concern the distribution of resources by region as well as opportunity within 
regions. Future research might find that other ethnic groups in Pakistan distinguish these 
subtypes of symbolic prejudice as welL We fear that further marginalization of sodeties like 
Pakistan can lead to inter-ethnic conflicts as is the case already in sub-Saharan Afiica. 
Robert Kaplan (1997) also foresees 'coming anarchy' in international politics, resulting 
firom economic disparity, famine, genodde, and environmental problems. He dtes Afidca and 
Afghamstan as examples of anarchy already taking shape in different regions of the world. 
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Kielv (1991) and Hoogvelt (1997) are rather pessimistic about what is left of 
developmentalism, but they see a ray of hope in development strategies being worked upon in 
the "excluded sphere." They feel that the intellectuals working with the masses that have been 
excluded firom globalization have an inherent advantage of "post structuralist thinking." They 
are autonomous, culturally grounded, democratic, and ecologically fidendly, without having to 
worry about "taming" the capital that already has abandoned the sphere they work for. Hume 
and Turner (1990) emphasize the significance of developing tools to allow local-level 
organizations to engage in development in areas where the global capital has left for good. 
Giddens (1999), however, is not as pessimistic. He thinks that state and politicians are 
still important "trade always needs a framework of institutions, as do other forms of economic 
development. Markets cannot be created by purely economic means" (1999). The nation-state, 
he agrees, is being reshaped; the world is ficaught with anxieties, and scarred by deep divisions, 
but the powerlessness we are feeling today is a reflection of the incapacities of our instimtions. 
"We need to reconstruct those we have, or create new ones, in ways appropriate to a global age." 
He admits that this is not a global order driven by collective human will. This system is 
emerging in anarchic, haphazard, fashion.. To achieve greater control over this runaway world, 
Giddens sviggests a greater role for the state and a need for the "democratization of democracy." 
He says, and we agree, that state and dvil society cannot be replaced with the free market. 
"Government, the economy and dvil sodety need to be in balance. If one dominates over the 
others, unfortunate consequences follow" (Reith lecture, 1999). 
Another important point Giddens (1999) makes is the need to for Building a "democracy 
of the emotions," in which democratic attimdes, induding tolerance, have to be devdoped and 
fostered by government. This in its turn should become the basis of government. It is 
particularly important for multiethnic soderies tinder economic strains. Instead of institutions 
like the World Trade Organization (WTO), there is a genuine need for fair and truly democratic 
global instimtions with nation states as its equitable members. To accomplish this the 
devdopment agenda will have to make another sharp turn, but this time away from promoting a 
global market, instead, for harnessing it. 
We end with a hopeful note from Giddens: 
We should and we can look to achieve greater control over our runaway world- We 
shan't be able to do so if we shirk the challenges, or pretend that all can go on as 
84 
before. For globalization is not incidental to our lives today. It is a shift in our very life 
circumstances. It is the way we now live" (1999, Reith Lecture). 
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